

**UNITED
NATIONS**



International Residual Mechanism
for Criminal Tribunals

Case No.: MICT-15-96-A

Date: 8 December 2021

Original: English

IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Carmel Agius
Judge Lee G. Muthoga
Judge Aminatta Lois Runeni N’gum
Judge Yusuf Aksar
Judge Claudia Hofer

Registrar: Mr. Abubacarr Tambadou

Date: 8 December 2021

PROSECUTOR

v.

**JOVICA STANIŠIĆ
FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ**

PUBLIC WITH PUBLIC ANNEX A

STANIŠIĆ MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

The Office of the Prosecutor:

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Ms. Laurel Baig
Ms. Barbara Goy

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Mr Wayne Jordash QC
Mr Joe Holmes

Counsel for Franko Simatović:

Mr Mihajlo Bakrač
Mr Vladimir Petrović

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Defence for Stanišić respectfully requests the Appeals Chamber to admit into evidence under Rule 142 of the IRMCT Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”) as additional evidence excerpts from a book published by Chris Spirou on 15 June 2021 titled “The Way to Dayton in Search of Peace: The Diary of the Eleventh Serbian – A True Story, Belgrade” (‘Book’). Mr Spirou is a prominent and long-standing member of the US political establishment. He is a former member of the House of Representatives in the United States between 1970 to 1984 and was personally involved in the negotiations leading up to the Dayton Peace Accords as a member of the Serbian delegation in 1995.¹
2. In his book, Spirou provides a first-hand account of the Dayton peace process and shares his insights regarding the significant role played by Stanišić in the course of the negotiations, including his prior and connected role in saving UN, French and American hostages. Spirou details various conversations he had with Stanišić, as well as a number of other individuals at key positions during the negotiations. These include, Goran Milinović, Milošević’s chef de cabinet during Dayton, Milan Milutinović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Peter Galbraith, the US Ambassador to Croatia from 1993 to 1998, US Congressman Bill Richardson, Nikola Koljević, the Vice President of Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996 and Rudolf Perina, the US Ambassador to Germany and Richard Holbrooke’s liaison to Milošević during the Dayton negotiations. The relevant excerpts can be found in Annex A.
3. As will be discussed below, these conversations, as well as Spirou’s personal insights during the Dayton peace negotiations, provide vital context and information related to the extent of Stanišić’s contributions to the achievement of peace and saving lives in the former Yugoslavia. These contributions have been recognised by the Trial Chamber in the Trial Judgment as a mitigating factor² and evidence of his (lack of) intent in relation to JCE liability.³ Accordingly, the additional evidence relates to: (i) Ground Eight of Stanišić’s appeal, namely the Trial Chamber’s error in law in “failing to take into consideration, and weigh appropriately as a mitigating factor, the entirety of Stanišić’s acts and conduct in relation to his cooperation with the international community during the war in Croatia and Bosnia in furtherance of peace and saving lives”⁴; and

¹ See Spirou’s CV at Annex A, pp 29-30.

² *Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović*, MICT-15-96-T, Judgment, 6 August 2021, (‘Judgment’), para. 627.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 596.

⁴ *Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović*, MICT-15-96-T, Stanišić Appeal Brief, 22 November 2021, (‘Stanišić Appeal Brief’), paras 244-256.

(ii) Sub-ground 1(B) of the Prosecution’s appeal, namely the Trial Chamber’s purported error in law and/or fact in failing to find that Stanisic shared the intent required for JCE liability.⁵

II. APPLICABLE LAW

4. As explained by the Appeals Chamber:

Rule 142 of the Rules governs the admission of additional evidence on appeal. For additional evidence to be admissible under Rule 142(C) of the Rules, the applicant must demonstrate that [it] was not available at trial in any form, or discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. The applicant must also show that the additional evidence is relevant to a material issue at trial and is credible. Once it has been determined that the additional evidence meets these conditions, the Appeals Chamber will determine... whether it *could* have been a decisive factor in reaching the verdict. Where the Appeals Chamber finds that the evidence was available at trial, it may still be admissible pursuant to Rule 142(C) of the Rules. However, in such a case, the applicant must demonstrate that the exclusion of the additional evidence *would* lead to a miscarriage of justice, in that, if it had been admitted at trial, it *would* have had an impact on the verdict.⁶

5. Furthermore, “the additional evidence must be directed at a specific finding of fact related to a conviction or to the sentence.”⁷ It is the applicant who “bears the burden of identifying with precision the specific findings of fact made by the trial chamber to which the additional evidence pertains, and of specifying with sufficient clarity the impact the additional evidence could or would have had upon the trial chamber’s verdict.”⁸

III. SUBMISSIONS

6. The Defence submits that its request meets the legal criteria under Rule 142 and, therefore, the additional evidence presented in Annex A should be admitted into evidence by the Appeals Chamber.

a. The additional evidence was not available during trial

7. As indicated above, the Book was published on 15 June 2021, two weeks before the delivery of the Trial Judgment.⁹ It was not available and/or discoverable during trial. As soon as the Defence

⁵ *Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović*, MICT-15-96-T, Prosecution Appeal Brief, 22 November 2021, (‘Prosecution Appeal Brief’), Sub-Ground 1(B)(ii)-(iii), paras 128-152.

⁶ *Prosecutor v. Mladić*, MICT-13-56-A, Decision on Motions for Admission of Additional Evidence on Appeal, 11 March 2020, (‘Mladić Decision on Additional Evidence’), para. 6; *Prosecutor v. Karadžić*, MICT-13-55-A, Decision on a Motion to Admit Additional Evidence on Appeal, 2 March 2018, (‘Karadžić Decision on Additional Evidence’), para. 7.

⁷ *Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al.*, ICTR-99-52-A, Decision on Appellant Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s Motion for Leave to Present Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 155 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 8 December 2006, para. 6.

⁸ *Mladić Decision on Additional Evidence*, para. 7; *Karadžić Decision on Additional Evidence*, para. 8; IRMCT Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 142(A).

⁹ See Annex, pp. 2-3.

became aware of the Book, it analysed its contents and moved to translate and admit the relevant excerpts outlined in Annex A into evidence.

b. The additional evidence is credible

8. The Defence submits that the excerpts included in Annex A are credible. In the past, the Appeals Chamber has refused to admit evidence under Rule 142 due to credibility only if it does not appear to be reasonably capable of belief or reliance.¹⁰
9. This is demonstrably not the case for the annexed excerpts. The Book was written by Chris Spirou, a former member of the House of Representatives in the United States between 1970 to 1984 and an active, respectable and prominent member of the US political establishment.¹¹ He has also been a guest lecturer in respectable universities including Harvard University and Dartmouth College. He is the current President of the Hellenic-American Union.¹² Spirou's professional background and current functions detailed in his annexed CV¹³ are indicative of his credibility.
10. Moreover, Spirou was personally engaged in the Dayton peace negotiations in 1995 as a member of the Serbian delegation during the Dayton negotiations. He has first-hand and contemporaneous knowledge regarding the negotiations, as well as the role played by key players, including Stanišić.

c. The additional evidence is relevant to material issues at trial

11. The Appeals Chamber jurisprudence indicates that the additional evidence is deemed relevant if it pertains to "findings material to the conviction or sentence, in the sense that those findings were crucial or instrumental to the conviction or sentence."¹⁴
12. The Defence submits that the additional evidence pertains to findings of the Trial Chamber which were crucial to, and/or instrumental in, Stanišić's conviction and sentence. As will be further detailed in the following section, the additional evidence explains and illustrates the extent of Stanišić's contributions to the achievement of peace and saving lives in former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, it directly relates to the Trial Chamber's findings in the Trial Judgment regarding

¹⁰ *Prosecutor v. Muvunyi*, ICTR-00-55A-A, Decision on Request to Admit Additional Evidence, 27 August 2007, para. 10; *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, IT-00-39-A, Decision on Appellant Momcilo Krajišnik's Motion to Call Radovan Karadžić pursuant to Rule 115, 16 October 2008, para. 5.

¹¹ See Annex A, pp. 29-30.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Mladić* Decision on Additional Evidence, para. 6, fn 25; See also *Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al.*, IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, 23 October 2001, para. 62.

Stanišić's contributions to peace as evidence of his (lack of) intent in relation to JCE liability and as a mitigating factor in relation to his sentence.¹⁵

13. Specifically, the Trial Chamber found that "Stanišić did on occasion demonstrate a willingness to resolve the conflict, work towards peace and provide humanitarian assistance during the relevant period."¹⁶ This was one of the factors cited by the Trial Chamber in relation to its conclusion that Stanišić did not share the intent to further the common criminal purpose,¹⁷ a finding which was appealed by the Prosecution.¹⁸
14. Further, the Trial Chamber concluded that "Stanišić's assistance in the release of 300 UNPROFOR hostages, captured French pilots, and an American journalist in Bijeljina, as well as his role at the Dayton Peace Conference in November 1995" was worthy of some "limited" mitigation.¹⁹ The Defence have appealed this finding, arguing that the Trial Chamber failed to take into consideration, and weigh appropriately as a mitigating factor, the entirety of Stanišić's acts and conduct in relation to his cooperation with the international community during the war in Croatia and Bosnia in furtherance of peace and saving lives.²⁰

c. The admission of the additional evidence could have been a decisive factor in the determination of Stanišić's sentence and *mens rea* in relation to JCE liability

15. The Defence submits that the additional evidence could have been a decisive factor in the Trial Chamber's decision to impose a sentence of 12 years of imprisonment on Stanišić.²¹ Indeed, since it reveals in detail how instrumental Stanišić was to the success of the Dayton peace negotiations and in relation to the saving of hundreds of hostages in the former Yugoslavia, had the Trial Chamber had the opportunity to consider this evidence, alongside other associated evidence, it would have been duty bound to assess Stanišić's cooperation for peace as worthy of *significant* mitigation.²²
16. Additionally, the additional evidence could have played a decisive role at Trial and on the Appeals Chamber assessment of the Prosecution appeal on Stanišić's intent in relation to JCE liability. In finding that Stanišić did not possess the requisite *mens rea* under JCE liability, the Trial Chamber recalled "its earlier finding that Stanišić did, on occasion, demonstrate a willingness to resolve the conflict, worked towards peace, and facilitated the provision of

¹⁵ Judgment, paras 596, 627.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 349.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 596.

¹⁸ See Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 128-152.

¹⁹ Judgment, para. 627.

²⁰ Stanišić Appeal Brief, paras 244-256.

²¹ As per IRMCT Rules, Rule 142(C).

²² See Judgment, para. 627.

humanitarian assistance during the relevant period.”²³ The Prosecution appealed this finding, arguing that “[t]he Chamber’s own findings and the totality of the evidence leave no doubt that Stanišić and Simatović did not only know of the criminal intent of the JCE members, but that they shared that intent.”²⁴ In order to substantiate this assertion, the Prosecution referred to a conversation between Stanišić and Karadžić in January 1992 and an entry in Mladic’s diary in relation to a meeting held in Belgrade in December 1993 where Stanišić allegedly offered to help the Bosnian operational and tactical position.²⁵ The Prosecution characterised these as contemporaneous examples of Stanišić promising other JCE members to support the criminal goals of the common criminal purpose.²⁶ At the very least, these contemporaneous records of Stanišić’s views concerning the Bosnian Serb leadership²⁷ run counter to these claims.

17. Further, referring to the Trial Chamber’s finding that Stanišić communicated and/or cooperated with the senior members of the political, military and police leadership in Serbia,²⁸ the SAO Krajina, the SAO SBWS and the Bosnian Serb Republic, the Prosecution argues that such “communication and coordination could not be viewed as benign in light of Stanišić’s and Simatović’s proven contributions to this years-long criminal campaign.”²⁹ As is plain from an analysis of Stanišić’s contemporaneous statements and views, he did not intend to make contributions to the extant JCE. Rather, his communications with the Bosnian Serbs were not only benign but reflective of his persistent and continuous efforts to convince them to accept a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

18. Specifically, the additional evidence provides further and essential details, relevant to both *mens rea* and sentence, including:

- i. The substantial role played by Stanišić in relation to saving the lives of the UN peacekeepers, French pilots and the American journalist David S. Rohde; and
- ii. The indispensable contributions of Stanišić to the achievement of peace in the former Yugoslavia through his role before (including through the saving of the hostages and foreign captives), during and after the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

i. The significant role played by Stanisic regarding the release of UN peacekeepers, French pilots and an American journalist

²³ *Ibid.*, para. 596.

²⁴ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 138.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 144.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ See below paras 22, 26, 27, 33-35.

²⁸ Judgment, para. 594.

²⁹ Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 144.

19. The additional evidence provides vital details in relation to the significant role played by Stanišić in securing the release of the UN peacekeepers, the French pilots who have gone missing over Bosnia³⁰ and the American journalist David S. Rohde in 1995, all of whom had been taken hostage and whose lives were threatened by the Bosnian Serb leadership. Between June and December 1995, Stanišić worked tirelessly to save these hostages,³¹ critical acts - without which the international community's peace efforts would have stalled and the Dayton peace talks may not have been possible.³²
20. In relation to the rescue of the UNPROFOR personnel in June 1995, Spirou states that Stanišić "risked everything to release the 400 United Nations soldiers who had been captured by Karadžić and Mladić and then tied to trees and telephone poles throughout the territory of Bosnia under Serbian control... After more than a month-long endeavours and efforts which would have impressed Hercules himself, risking both his own life and the lives of his commandos, Jovica Stanišić informed President Milošević that all these soldiers, to the last man, had been released and taken out of Bosnia unharmed, their heads held high. It was hellishly hard to do that."³³
21. On the release of the American journalist David S. Rohde in November 1995, Spirou states that "[w]hen Koljević told me at breakfast that the reporter had been released, I knew immediately that something had happened before breakfast. As of the day before, I had been aware that Chief Stanišić had launched an operation on that issue."³⁴ Later on, Stanišić told Spirou that "Mr. David Rohde is in Belgrade. He is fine, he is healthy and free. At the moment, Rohde is in the building of the State Security Service in Belgrade. He will soon be handed over to Tom Sorenson at the US Embassy in Belgrade..."³⁵
22. Importantly, Stanišić further commented "you know what kind of liars those in Pale are. They lied to Koljević all week, so he in turn lied to us and to Holbrooke. Holbrooke relied on Koljević to communicate with Karadžić just like us... I did what had to be done. I issued Karadžić an order that he could not refuse. Many of us are tired of Karadžić's ravings."³⁶ In a similar vein, in a conversation with Spirou after the conclusion of the Dayton agreement, Stanišić commented "[a]

³⁰ Concerning the release of the French pilots in December 1995, the additional evidence reveals that Nebojša Vujović conveyed to Spirou that Stanišić told him that "for two weeks now, [Stanišić's] special agents in Bosnia have been trying to locate the French pilots. They have still not managed to find them. The Chief told me that General Mladić had sworn on the grave of his daughter that he doesn't know where the French pilots are, and all three top Bosnian Serb delegates here in Dayton denied knowing anything about the French pilots." See Annex A, p. 9.

³¹ See *Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović*, MICT-15-96-T, Stanišić Final Trial Brief, 13 March 202, ('Stanišić FTB'), paras 166-177.

³² See Stanišić FTB, para. 1626.

³³ Annex A, p. 7; See also p. 20.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

far as we are concerned, we were lied to. On the 21st day in Dayton, we were accused, tricked and betrayed by the Serbian fundamentalist leaders from Republic Srpska... The European leaders who are against Serbia and Milošević, together with the Republicans from the U.S. Congress who are against Clinton, have been profiting from the crazy behaviour of Karadžić and his associates for years, and are punishing the people of Serbia and Montenegro with sanctions that have crippled our economy. They have turned every Serb into a prisoner of the crazed and inhumane behaviour of Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Momčilo Krajišnik and many others in Republika Srpska.”³⁷ As observed, in light of the Prosecution’s continued attempt to implicate Stanišić in a JCE with the Bosnian Serbs, Spirou’s contemporaneous record of Stanišić’s contempt for the Bosnian Serb leadership’s extremism and *their* war is highly relevant and probative of a lack of his shared intent.

ii. Stanišić’s persistent efforts for peace before, during and after the Dayton Peace Accords

23. Most importantly, the additional evidence provides critical details and first-hand information regarding Stanišić’s persistent efforts towards peace before, during and after the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords. Indeed, the additional evidence demonstrates that, contrary to the finding of the Trial Chamber - that Stanišić did not “on occasion, demonstrate a willingness to resolve the conflict, [work] towards peace, and [facilitate] the provision of humanitarian assistance”³⁸ - he, in fact, did so consistently and persistently over the course of the conflict.
24. Indeed, the additional evidence shows that Spirou concluded that Stanišić was “an advocate/champion of peace”³⁹ who supported peace efforts in former Yugoslavia from day one.⁴⁰
25. First, the additional evidence is relevant and probative of Stanišić’s efforts to convince the Bosnian Serb leadership to participate in good faith in the peace efforts *prior* to Dayton. For instance, Spirou states that Stanišić knew “that the catastrophic events in Krajina were due to the decisions of the leaders of the Serbs in Croatia to unite their forces with Radovan Karadzic. And these decisions in turn led to the chaos in the region and in the lives of thousands of people. Chief Stanišić... [has] been trying for years to convince Radovan Karadžić, over and over again, to accept a peace agreement that would end the civil war in Bosnia.”⁴¹
26. Further, Spirou states that Stanišić “demanded on numerous occasions that Karadžić and Mladić stop their inhuman conduct, stop their war games, stop killing innocent people and accept the

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁸ See Judgment, paras 349 and 596.

³⁹ Annex A, pp. 11 and 26.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

peace proposals to end the civil war in Bosnia.”⁴² This is corroborated by the fact that, according to Koljević, Stanišić did his best “to convince Karadžić to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. I myself tried everything, too. But we failed. Karadžić had the votes of the Parliament.”⁴³ Similarly, Mladić confirmed that Stanišić did all he could “to put pressure on Karadžić to accept the peace plan for ending the war in Bosnia. Karadžić and his political leadership rejected every single peace plan proposed.”⁴⁴

27. In addition to his role in the resolution of the hostage crises detailed above,⁴⁵ the additional evidence also provides crucial insights into the significant role played Stanišić during the Dayton peace negotiations to persuade the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept peace.⁴⁶ According to Spirou, during his months long engagement with the Serbian delegation in Dayton, Stanišić’s “sole objective was to persuade Karadžić to support various peace proposals and liberate all U.N. peacekeepers that Karadžić was holding hostage.”⁴⁷ For instance, according to Milutinović, Stanišić “did his best to convince Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb leaders that peace is the only option...”⁴⁸ Similarly, when Karadžić and Mladić refused to remove heavy weaponry from the surroundings of Sarajevo in September 1995, it was Stanišić who “told General Mladić that his crazy conduct would not be tolerated, that he was to stop it immediately and conform with the agreement reached with NATO and the United Nations.”⁴⁹
28. Ultimately, according to Spirou, “it was Stanišić, his perseverance and top negotiation skills, that swayed Karadžić and Bosnian Serb nationalists from Bosnia to accept and sign the unity agreement...”⁵⁰ Spirou assessed that the unity agreement represented “the agreement of the Serbian people on unity for peace [and] a safe prevention from a mini world war in the Balkans.”⁵¹
29. In a conversation with US Congressman Bill Richardson regarding the Dayton negotiations, Spirou stated that “[Stanišić] and his national security forces are working [on the Dayton peace negotiations] around the clock... Stanišić will also be the one who will be accompanying President Milošević in the coming days while a comprehensive peace agreement for the Balkans is being formulated.”⁵² To this, Richardson replied “Stanišić is an important player in the peace

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁵ See above paras 19-22.

⁴⁶ See, for instance, Annex A, p. 17.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

effort. You should know that our intelligence thinks highly of Stanišić. There is great respect for Stanistic in our intelligence community. Europeans and Russians also hold Stanišić and his organization in high regard. A very high-ranking security official in our national security structures told me that Stanišić is a tough operative, but a man of his word and not the one to play games with you.”⁵³

30. Moreover, the additional evidence contains certain statements made by Stanišić himself which demonstrates his aspirations and supportive attitude towards peace. Similarly, upon hearing that the Bosnian Muslim leadership rejected US Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s peace plan, Stanišić told Spirou “[i]f we do it calmly, positively and firmly, we will succeed. Like you said, we will have an Agreement to sign tomorrow... We will walk the last steps to peace together.”⁵⁴ Once a peace agreement was reached, Stanišić told Spirou “we have peace. Thank God, we finally have peace... Peace that we have worked on so hard... Peace is the only thing that offers people security... War and killing are for uncivilized people.”⁵⁵ Stanišić further stated “[w]e will co-exist peacefully without neighbours and there won’t be any senseless killing.”⁵⁶
31. As argued in Ground Eight of Stanišić’s appeal, Stanišić’s contributions to peace were not limited to his role during the Dayton peace negotiations. As indicated by RJS-01’s (the CIA’s Belgrade Station Chief) evidence, Stanišić provided significant assistance to the CIA in pursuing the “successful implementation” of the Dayton Accords by maintaining the Bosnian Serb leadership’s focus upon the peace process.⁵⁷ In this sense, the additional evidence corroborates and supplements RJS-01’s evidence regarding Stanišić’s contributions to peace subsequent to the conclusion of the Dayton Accords.⁵⁸ Stanišić’s role was indispensable for the implementation of the peace agreement. In describing the significance of Stanišić’s role in this respect, Spirou stated “[n]o peace agreement, even when it has been reached, can be fully implemented in the broken Yugoslavia without the full support on the part of Stanišić and his national security team.”⁵⁹ Indeed, Stanišić was appointed by Milošević to be “in charge of a complete implementation of the peace agreement and the protection of the peacekeepers.”⁶⁰
32. Upon assuming this role, Stanišić informed Spirou that the Serbs “will keep all the promises we made... We will implement fully every phase of the peace agreement we signed. We will fully protect the peace keeping forces sent by the international community to assist us in the

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁵⁷ Stanistic Appeal Brief, para. 248.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Annex A, p. 5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

implementation of the peace agreement. And we will make sure that no American civilians or military personnel get hurt. The same goes for all other peacekeeping forces as well.”⁶¹ Stanišić further stated that he “will work 24 hours a day to ensure that what we agreed to...is implemented, and that what I was entrusted with is done right and honourably. Serbia, its President, Foreign Minister and State Security Service are fully committed to the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Dayton, and to ensuring complete security of the peacekeepers, who will be sent there for the purpose of its implementation...”⁶²

33. Similarly, Stanišić told Spirou “[w]hen we return to Belgrade, we will assemble the leaders of Bosnian Serbs and inform them of the decisions adopted at indirect negotiations. You can be sure that after that meeting, they will join us in implementing every single provision of the general peace agreement. They won't reject peace this time... They have done it too many times in the past. It's over now. Peace won, they lost. We have silenced the weapons in Bosnia and Croatia forever. Thousands of innocent lives will be saved, and the crazy war lords, as you call them, on all sides, will pay for their inhumane acts.”⁶³
34. This was confirmed by Koljević who told Spirou that “Stanišić told me he would throw all of us in prison... Milutinović and Stanišić said... '[w]e have to work on the full implementation of the agreement'... Milošević and Stanišić won't tolerate anything anymore. They worked on achieving the peace agreement and lifting the sanctions, day and night, for years.... while Karadžić and Krajišnik played their fundamentalist war games... Stanišić just told us... 'your war games and your obsession with killing people are finished. Peace has won...'”⁶⁴ These statements once again demonstrate the significant divide between Stanišić and the Bosnian Serbian leadership as well as former's commitment to ensuring that the latter act in accordance with the peace efforts.
35. As the Stanišić Defence argued in the trial, a vital component of Stanišić's role in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords was the role Stanišić played in persuading Karadžić to withdraw from all political functions in RS after the Dayton Peace Accords.⁶⁵ As confirmed by the excerpts sought to be admitted, Stanišić commented “[w]hen we cross the river in a boat carrying Bosnian Serbian leadership for the elections in new Bosnia in 1996, Radovan Karadžić won't be in that boat. Neither will any of his associates. With their senseless acts, Karadžić and his fundamentalist group have given up any right to be part of the political leadership of Republika Srpska.”⁶⁶

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

⁶⁵ See 1D00055, 1D02-3236, para. 8.

⁶⁶ Annex A, p. 25-26.

IV. CONCLUSION

36. Accordingly, the Defence submits that the additional evidence could of had a decisive effect in the determination of Stanišić’s sentence and *mens rea* in relation to JCE liability. It demonstrates that Stanišić’s contribution to the achievement of peace in the former Yugoslavia went significantly over and beyond “a willingness to resolve the conflict, work towards peace, and provide humanitarian assistance [on occasion]”⁶⁷ or some unspecified “role at the Dayton Peace Conference in November 1995.”⁶⁸ In recognising this, in turn, the Trial Chamber would have accorded more weight to Stanišić’s contributions to peace and saving lives than “some limited weight”⁶⁹ and reduced his sentence accordingly.
37. Additionally, the additional evidence provides a contemporaneous view of Stanišić’s contempt for the Bosnian Serb leadership’s continued extremism and their refusal to end the war and his persistent efforts to persuade them to act in good faith during the peace negotiations. The evidence is highly relevant and probative of a lack of his shared intent and thus relevant to the Prosecution’s Appeal Sub-ground 1(B).
38. Based on the foregoing, the Defence requests the Appeals Chamber to admit the annexed excerpts as critical evidence that with due consideration could be decisive in the consideration of Stanišić’s appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT

39. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber should admit the annexed excerpts into evidence and give it due consideration in its assessment of Stanišić’s appeal.

Respectfully submitted,



Wayne Jordash QC

⁶⁷ Judgment, paras 349 and 596.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 627.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Counsel for Jovica Stanišić

8 December 2021

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SIMATOVIĆ**

PUBLIC

ANNEX A

RELEVANT EXCERPTS

Testimonies Edition
Book number 6

Editor
Hadži Dragan Antić

Treći milenijum®

CHRIS SPIROU

THE ROAD TO DAYTONIN

SEARCH OF PEACE

THE DIARY OF THE ELEVENTH SERB - A TRUE STORY

Volume II

BELGRADE, June 2021

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[page 127]

Thursday, 31 August 1995

At 02:30 a.m. on Thursday 31 August 1995, Minister Milutinović called me from Belgrade.

"Chris, it's Milan. Are you awake? Can we talk? I have some important news", said Minister Milutinović in one breath.

"No, Milan, I'm not awake. It's three o'clock in the morning. Let me get ready for good news. It'd better be good, or else you'll return to the rank of ambassador," I told Minister Milutinović as I was trying to figure out if I was dreaming or the phone call was real. "It's not three o'clock, Chris. It's half past two in Athens because it's half past one in Belgrade," said Minister Milutinović in an excited voice.

"OK, Milan, I'm ready. Let's hear the good news," I told Minister Milutinović.

"Well, Chris, we made it! President Milošević managed to reach a unity agreement with all Serbian leaders in Serbia and abroad. He will lead a team that will participate in peace talks in the coming days. President Milošević will have the right to veto all decisions. Everyone signed the agreement, including Karadžić and Mladić, and also the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church and his deputy. And as President Milošević has repeatedly told you, the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church strongly supported Karadžić and nationalists in Serbia and Bosnia. I'll fax you a copy of the agreement first thing in the morning," Minister Milutinović said in a tone of satisfaction and relief, and dead tired.

"Congratulations, Milan! That's really great news, you did well to wake me up in the middle of the night. Please tell President Milošević that I am proud of him. Despite all the difficulties we are going to face in the coming period, we will eventually reach a peace agreement, an agreement that will put an end to all the horrors of recent years in a country that was once a great and beautiful Yugoslavia. How did President Milošević manage to achieve this, Milan?" I asked, now completely awake and ready to dance in Serbian-Greek-American style.

"President Milošević decided that this was the right moment. It was now or never. Peace now or war for the next ten years. So, he did what needed to be done. We all helped. Jovica Stanišić, head of the State Security, did his best to convince Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb leaders that peace is the only option they have and that they should join President Milošević in his efforts to achieve it. Karadžić and other nationalists of his signed it, Chris. They signed the agreement that says it all, I'll send it to you tomorrow, Chris. President Milošević wanted you to hear it first. That's why I've called you at this hour," said enthusiastically the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"Thanks, Milan. And thank President Milošević on my behalf and tell him that I will stand by him every step of the way to the finish line, where peace awaits us. Good night, Milan," I said to Minister Milutinović.

Well, now I was going to sleep with a smile! When I got up, it would still be Thursday morning. But I had to make a few notes before I went back to bed.

The unity agreement that President Milošević and Jovica Stanišić managed to reach, the agreement of the Serbian people on unity for peace, represented for me a safe prevention from a mini world war in the Balkans!

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"Chris, tell me if there is anything else I can do to help. There seems to be no need for me to get there now. I don't want to be seen as someone pushing himself into the centre of peace efforts," Congressman Richardson said.

"Bill Richardson, you beat me to it again. And I thought I was going to tell you the good news about the agreement that Milošević and Stanišić managed to reach. Yes, Bill, Milošević is now in control. Everyone has signed it and he has the right to veto all decisions. As you know very well, Milošević is completely committed to peace and will do everything he can to achieve peace. You were a huge help, Bill. President Milošević, Minister Milutinović, Chief Stanišić and the entire Serbian people are deeply grateful to you for your help in peace efforts. And I really appreciate all the help you have given me. That was historical endeavour, Bill. Thank you," I told Congressman Richardson.

"Chris, let me ask you something. How is Milutinović doing in his role as the Minister of Foreign Affairs these days?" Congressman Richardson asked.

"Milan Milutinović is doing great, Bill. He is working 18 hours a day, 7 days a week, constantly, for peace," I told Richardson.

"Tell me, Chris, before we say goodbye, is Stanišić passionate about the peace initiative? Does Stanišić support President Milošević's current efforts to achieve peace?" Congressman Richardson asked.

"As you well know, Bill, Jovica Stanišić, head of the State Security of Serbia and Montenegro, has supported President Milošević's efforts for peace from day one. He and his national security forces are working on it round the clock. President Milošević himself told you that when you met. I was present, remember? Bill, it was Stanišić who risked his life in the caves of Bosnia to persuade Radovan Karadžić to release the 500 members of the United Nations he had taken hostage. The then UN hostages are now safely at home in their respective countries thanks to Milošević and Jovica Stanišić and his brave commandos. Also, it was Stanišić, his perseverance and top negotiation skills, that swayed Karadžić and Bosnian Serb nationalists from Bosnia to accept and sign the unity agreement that is making everyone so happy now.

Jovica Stanišić will also be the one who will be accompanying President Milošević in the coming days while a comprehensive peace agreement for the Balkans is being formulated. No peace agreement, even when it has been reached, can be fully implemented in the broken Yugoslavia without full support on the part of Stanišić and his national security team," I told Congressman Richardson.

"That's good to know, Chris. Stanišić is an important player in the peace effort. You should know that our intelligence think highly of Stanišić. There is great respect for Stanišić in our intelligence community. Europeans and Russians also hold Stanišić and his organization in high regard. A very high-ranking security official in our national security structures told me that Stanišić is a tough operative, but a man of his word and not the one to play games with you", said Richardson.

"Bill, before you hang up, please do me and the peace one more favour. Please ask President Clinton, for my and your sake, and for the sake of peace, to stop NATO bombing of Serbs in Bosnia. Tell President Clinton not to give Karadžić an excuse to withdraw his signature from the unity agreement which he has signed. It doesn't take Karadžić much to break his word. He has done this before in critical moments. Please tell President Clinton not to give Karadžić a chance to ruin another peace agreement. Tell President Clinton, on my behalf, that it is time to support President Milošević's efforts. This is *the* moment, Bill, it's now! Stop the NATO bombing of Serbs in Bosnia. It is counterproductive and unfair," I told Congressman Richardson.

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Wednesday, 6 September 1995

At 11:00 I called Minister Milutinović in Belgrade and informed him of my conversation with Congressman Richardson the night before.

"They are right, Chris. Karadžić and Mladić are at war and are not acting in accordance with the agreement on the removal of heavy weapons from the surroundings of Sarajevo. The French are playing their games, the Germans want to subdue the Serbs by bombing, and the Bosnian Muslims are playing the martyrs. They are all working together to undermine Clinton's peace initiative. President Milošević is committed to continuing his efforts to convene a peace conference as soon as possible and has told everyone to stop this nonsense and help achieve peace," Minister Milutinović said.

"That's it, Milan. Tell President Milošević to convey this message to Karadžić and Mladić. He should tell them that they will destroy not only the entire Republika Srpska, but also the entire Serbian people," I told Minister Milutinović.

"President Milošević has already done that, Chris. Acting on behalf of President Milošević, Jovica Stanišić told General Mladić that his crazy conduct would not be tolerated, that he was to stop it immediately and conform with the agreement reached with NATO and the United Nations," Minister Milutinović said.

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"Chris, let me tell you, he also got my client in trouble. Karadžić is the president, he is the one who is consulted. Milošević has nothing to do with Karadžić. Milošević is in contact with this /contact of/ mine only through his head of the State Security Service, who is called Stanišić. I was told that Stanišić was a dangerous rowdy. Mladić told me that Milošević and Stanišić did their best to put pressure on Karadžić to accept the peace plan for ending the war in Bosnia. Karadžić and his political leadership rejected every single peace plan proposed," Likurezos said.

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"Ambassador Galbraith, tell Secretary Christopher, Secretary Holbrooke, General Clark and anyone who wants to listen that if they want to achieve anything with the crazy Bosnian Serb warlords in Pale at this moment, they must do so in cooperation with President Milošević. Tell them this on my behalf, and I will also tell them myself, not to play the German-Bosnian Muslim game of pinning on President Milošević every political and military wrongdoing on the part of Karadžić and Mladić, or indeed of any other Bosnian Serb. President Milošević, more than anyone else on earth, and his head of the security service demanded on numerous occasions that Karadžić and Mladić stop their inhuman conduct, stop their war games, stop killing innocent people and accept the peace proposals to end the civil war in Bosnia.

Jovica Stanišić risked everything to release the 400 United Nations soldiers who had been captured by Karadžić and Mladić and then tied to trees and telephone poles throughout the territory of Bosnia under Serbian control. I was present when the then Ambassador Frasure, on behalf of President Clinton, asked President Milošević to help the United Nations peacekeepers be released unharmed.

Translation

Yes, Ambassador Galbraith, I was present, and so was the Chargé d'Affaires Perina, when President Milošević responded on the spot to Ambassador Frasure's request: 'Mr. Frasure, you should know that Serbs do not keep soldiers of the peacekeeping forces in captivity. Serbs do not shoot at soldiers who wear peacekeeper insignia or wave a white flag. Serbs do not kill civilians. Serbs fight as warriors, against other warriors. Capturing peacekeepers is lack of honour, Mr. Frasure.' After saying this to Ambassador Frasure, he instructed his Chief of National Security Services Jovica Stanišić to deploy Serb commandos along the border with Bosnia and to bring each United Nations peacekeeper out of captivity in an honourable way.

Unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador, Bob Frasure was killed. He was a good American and a great diplomat. But you can check what I have just told you with Rudy Perina. Secretary Holbrooke also knows that what I have just told you is a fact, he knows it very well. Maybe he doesn't want to admit it publicly, because he wants to appease the Republican leaders in the Congress who are unwaveringly against Serbia and Milošević. But Holbrooke knows that what I have just told you is the whole truth. I will tell you one more thing, which Holbrooke also knows very well. After more than a month-long endeavours and efforts which would have impressed Hercules himself, risking both his own life and the lives of his commandos, Jovica Stanišić informed President Milošević that all these soldiers, to the last man, had been released and taken out of Bosnia unharmed, their heads held high. It was hellishly hard to do that. But Milošević and Stanišić did it. They did it in the Serbian way - honourably and with dignity. None of the peacekeepers were injured during the operation. None even with as much as a nosebleed, not a single one! When I asked President Milošević why he did not announce to the world that Chief Stanišić and the commandos from his country had acted on his orders to free the peacekeepers, you know what he answered? 'Chris, I am trying to lead a country that is under tough sanctions. I don't have time to direct John Wayne-style movie scenes. And I have no desire to gain publicity on the crazy conduct of others, as I have already told you so many times.'

Ambassador Galbraith, President Milošević and Jovica Stanišić need absolutely no one from Pale. Like the rest of the world, they do not know what to do with the leadership in Pale and at the same time avoid a civil war with Serbia itself. Karadžić enjoys the support of the powerful Serbian Orthodox Church. He also has the support of a few Serbian nationalists, as well as of several Serbian paramilitary formations in Serbia and Croatia. Now that the Serbian Orthodox Church and most of the political leaders have granted President Milošević full authority with the final right of veto, you will see how he will deal with the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale. I can guarantee you, Ambassador Galbraith, their days in power are now numbered.

Ambassador Galbraith, if you wish to hear my humble opinion, President Milošević will easily accept and sign a peace agreement which will remove the current Bosnian Serb leaders from the leadership positions in Republika Srpska. The catch will be how to formulate and implement such agreement. If you do that correctly and honestly, if you play fair with President Milošević, you will succeed. If, however, in these negotiations you continue with the German-Bosnian Muslim practice of demonising Slobodan Milošević and holding him responsible for all the nonsense done by Bosnian Serb warlords, you will be defeated. And that defeat will be nasty," I told Ambassador Galbraith.

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"Mr. Chris, President Milošević has asked you to convey a message to Secretary Holbrooke regarding the newspaper reporter who was held as a prisoner in Pale. Tell them that early this morning, President Milošević, President Bulatović, Minister Milutinović and Chief

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Stanišić met with Nikola Koljević. President Milošević told Koljević that he wanted the reporter Rohde to be released unharmed and allowed to leave Republika /Srpska/ safely. And this not in a couple of days, but within a couple of hours. Within a couple of hours, the President told Koljević. Koljević then went to Pale with Chief Stanišić to convey that message. You remember what the president went through with them regarding the hostages of the United Nations?" Milinović said.

"Of course I remember, Goran. I hosted the meeting in Belgrade when President Milošević ordered Stanišić to take the hostages out of Bosnia, and to do it honourably. And Stanišić did so. The late Bob Frasure was at that meeting, and so was Rudy Perina. Well, you were at that meeting, too, Goran. You remember?" I told Milinović.

"Oh yes. The meeting was held in the villa you were staying in," Goran Milinović said.

"I don't forget anything, Goran. I'm going to find Rosemary Gikas and ask her to pass the president's message to Secretary Holbrooke," I told Milinović.

As I was walking towards Rosemary Gikas, I was thinking about how my brain works unmistakably. When Koljević told me at breakfast that the reporter had been released, I knew immediately that something had happened before breakfast. As of the day before, I had been aware that Chief Stanišić had launched an operation on that issue. This morning's meeting between President Milošević and Koljević was just a confirmation that President Milošević was controlling the whole thing. Karadžić may have needed to earn a point there, so he got President Milošević to interfere directly. Someone should tell Karadžić that President Milošević will not have mercy on him because of everything he has done to the shame of the Serbian people during the last few years. But that remains to be done a little later. Now we need to free David Rohde first, unharmed, and do it promptly."

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"Rudy, I knew I should never have relied on a teacher who lectures on Shakespeare, which is what Koljević does, to complete anything but a poem! Let me try and find Chief Stanišić, so the two of us can go to President Milošević and see how he wants to proceed on that issue. This thing has definitely got out of control. Karadžić is playing games again. I'll call you when I know something definite," I told Perina.

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If he had arrived in Belgrade, Minister Milutinović would have informed me, which means that Stanišić's operation to extract Rohde from Bosnia is still ongoing.

I did 10 poor push-ups and got ready. At 9:00 a.m., I called Ralph Begleiter at the CNN headquarters in Washington. Begleiter is one of the best journalists in the CNN. I was introduced to him by Gene Randall, another respected and experienced CNN journalist and a good friend of mine. Begleiter was not there. I left a recorded message. I wanted to give Begleiter first-hand information about the expected release of David Rohde.

At 9:30 a.m., Nebojša Vujović came to my apartment.

"Chief Stanišić still has no concrete news about Rohde. As soon as he receives definite information personally in his hands, he will come to you, Chris", Vujović said.

At 9:50 a.m., I called Gene Gibbons, another notable and respected reporter in Washington, who is also a White House correspondent for the Reuters news agency. Gene Gibbons is a good friend of mine and a very reliable correspondent. I informed Gibbons that the "operation" to get David Rohde out of Bosnia was "ongoing", and promised to let him know as soon as Rohde arrived in Belgrade.

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Fifteen minutes later, at 10:15 a.m., Chief Stanišić came to my apartment with Nebojša Vujović.

"Chris, Minister Milutinović has authorised me to tell you the following: Mr. David Rohde is in Belgrade. He is fine, he is healthy and free. At the moment, Rohde is in the building of the State Security Service in Belgrade. He will soon be handed over to Tom Sorenson at the US Embassy in Belgrade," Chief Stanišić told me. Nebojša Vujović translated, and I memorized and wrote down each word that the Chief pronounced.

"How did you manage to get him out, Chief?" I asked him.

"My friend, you know what kind of liars those in Pale are. They lied to Koljević all week, so he in turn lied to us and to Holbrooke. Holbrooke relied on Koljević to communicate with Karadžić just like us. When Christopher asked President Milošević for help, the president issued an order; I did what had to be done. I issued Karadžić an order that he could not refuse. Many of us are tired of Karadžić's ravings", said the composed chief of security.

"And the details? When are you going to tell me about them, Chief?" I asked him with a smile.

"When I tell you the details of how the United Nations hostages were rescued, my friend, Chris Spirou," said the chief of security, now with a half-smile.

"That'll do for me, Chief," I said

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"For heaven's sake, Nebojša what have I done to be linked to the French pilots gone missing over Bosnia? What is it all about?" I asked Vujović. "Here's what happened. In the last three hours, I received four phone calls from the French ambassador to Washington, who told me that President Chirac wanted to talk to President Milošević in person about the two French pilots who are reportedly gone missing over Bosnia. The French suspect that they are being held by Bosnian Serbs. Chirac must have read today's headline in the newspaper Le Figaro. The title you're responsible for, Chris," Vujović said.

"What is that title in Le Figaro, Nebojša?" I asked.

"The headline reads: 'Milošević helped liberate an American journalist.' That's the title. And now the French want Milošević to help find their pilots who are allegedly being held in the Serbian part of Bosnia, and to release them," Vujović said.

"Everything I told Gene Gibbons about how David Rohde was released is true. It was thanks to President Milošević, Chief Stanišić and Milan Milutinović. Did you pass the French's request to President Milošević?" I asked Vujović.

"I first talked to Stanišić. He told me that for two weeks now, his special agents in Bosnia have been trying to locate the French pilots. They have still not managed to find them. The Chief told me that General Mladić had sworn on the grave of his daughter that he doesn't know where the French pilots are, and all three top Bosnian Serb delegates here in Dayton denied knowing anything about the French pilots," Vujović said.

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"Tonight, the president had a long and difficult meeting with Haris Silajdžić, the prime minister of Bosnian Muslims. Tonight, Silajdžić proposed the craziest reshaping of Bosnia so far. The president is very concerned about the possibility that Silajdžić may have conceived his unacceptable proposal with the knowledge and approval of the local American team. If that is the case, if this is the American position on the issue of lines on the map of Bosnia, my advice to the president will be to get on his plane and immediately leave this conference. He and I meet early in the morning to talk about situation before making any moves. The

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president asked me to meet with you before our morning meeting. The president is asking for your opinion and advice," Chief Stanišić said.

"Where is the president now? How is he?" I asked.

"He is fine. We parted just a while ago. We met after the meeting with Silajdžić to try and figure out what was happening," Chief Stanišić said.

"Chief, what you experienced tonight is the result of the strategy of the Bosnian Muslims, Turkey and Germany to undermine this peace conference. Throughout the week, Izetbegović presented the delimitation proposals, each one crazier than the other. Now it's Silajdžić's turn. Neither of them have achieved anything, because they didn't want to in the first place. Both the proposals that Izetbegović presented and the one presented tonight by Silajdžić were conceived by the anti-Serb and anti-Milošević lobbies of the Bosnian Muslims who are helping them here in Dayton. Some members of Holbrooke's team may have attended the writing of Silajdžić's proposal, as well as the meetings at which Izetbegović's proposals were presented. But this does not mean that such proposals enjoy the support of the US State Department. Holbrooke's team is here on a mission to provide coordination, technical support, advice and guidance. They are not here with a mandate to dictate terms. Besides, they have no idea which part of Bosnia belongs to whom. Do you think that they know that almost 70% of the land in Bosnia used to be owned by Serbs once, before they were expelled from their country by jihadists led by Izetbegović?

The reason why Holbrooke and his team act as babysitters to the Bosnian Muslims here lies in the nature of recent American domestic politics. Republican leaders in Congress are eager to support the Bosnian Muslims, and they want the civil war to continue. They hope that President Clinton will be forced to become militarily involved in the Bosnian conflict. Had the leading positions in the Congress remained in the hands of the Democrats, you would have seen a completely different outcome of the Bosnian conflict a long time ago.

Holbrooke somehow found himself under crossfire. Bosnian Muslim leaders are pursuing different strategies for different purposes here, with different suggestions; in addition, you have Germany and the Contact Group trying to figure out which of these Bosnian Muslim proposals they can support, and then you have Republicans in Congress who blindly support any proposal by Bosnian Muslim leaders in the hope that this peace conference will fail. This means that Holbrooke is balancing on the rope and moving in one different direction or another depending on the situation. However, they won't achieve anything with such strategy, and they know it. This peace conference, Chief, can only fail if President Milošević gives up on it. And that is exactly what the Bosnian Muslims and their anti-Serb advisers and helpers are trying to achieve. They are desperately trying to impose a scenario that will make President Milošević react and leave the negotiations. We must not be fooled by the smell of cheese they have put in their trap. We must resist the temptation to enter the trap. And each of their proposals is a trap.

We can be sure of three things, Chief. Holbrooke cannot propose to Christopher to leave Dayton without a peace agreement in his hands; Secretary Christopher would remove him immediately. Neither can the Bosnian Muslims leave Dayton without an agreement, they have nowhere else to go. And Tudjman will not leave Dayton as long as Milošević is there, and as long as the agreements reached by the two of them remain. Holbrooke will definitely not take the initiative to propose to Secretary Christopher to dismiss the negotiations. Christopher and the White House have not taken over the organization of these negotiations in order to meet Silajdžić's and Izetbegović's political needs. Secretary Christopher has opened these negotiations and he will close them, with the agreement in his hands.

Mark my words, Chief Stanišić. Bosnian Muslim leaders are behaving irresponsibly, and they present their unjust and insane proposals, as you said, because they did not look to law and justice in front of them, but riveted their attention on the strength and power behind them,

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on the political and military power of their protectors which would, allegedly, secure an independent Muslim nation state for them.

Chief Stanišić, here is what I suggest. President Milošević /should/ remain firm and tough, show no signs of anger or frustration. He should reject every proposal that is unjust and biased and does not respect the historical rights of The Serbs in Bosnia or Serbia' equal footing in these negotiations. Above all, he must be patient, even more than before. Every time they come up with an unfair proposal, he should simply say no.

I suggest that President Milošević request a meeting with Holbrooke tomorrow morning and tell him that he is ready and willing to stay in Dayton for Thanksgiving, and even for Christmas if need be. Give Holbrooke a map proposal for Bosnia that you and the president have drafted, I'm sure you have it. /I suggest/ the president ask Holbrooke to convene a meeting of the three parties and, at that meeting and in Holbrooke's presence, he present his equitable plan to Tudjman and Izetbegović, and have a copy of it delivered to Secretary Christopher. And then, let Holbrooke explain to Secretary Christopher why he thinks he is obligated to save the political skins of Izetbegović, Silajdžić and Šaćirbej, rather than the lives of thousands of people, as well as Bill Clinton's presidential position.

I suggest we don't press the panic button. We remain calm and advise President Milošević not to lose sight of the reward, and the reward is peace, the lifting of sanctions and saving people's lives. All of us in this room have been searching for peace for a long, long time, together with Slobodan Milošević. No one said we would find it here in a week or two. It took us a year and a half to sniff it, and now we have driven it out to the clearing. I am convinced that we will manage to catch it as well if we are patient and focused," I told Chief Stanišić.

"Chris, you know that the president has very little time to make a key decision," Chief Stanišić said.

"Chief, as I see it, the only critically important thing the president is facing is the reality. We have to face the reality, and the reality here requires patience and determination. You know better than anyone else that patience is a virtue, especially in your profession. They must not drive us out of our peacekeeping mission, Chief. And neither can we leave. I am saying - let us exhaust them! Their option means that we need to go out on the battlefield. I say we should refuse to do so. We should tell them - not war! Peace, you fools, peace!" I told Chief Stanišić.

"OK, my friend. As always, you analyse the situation from the aspect of reality as a key factor. Let's all meet for breakfast in the morning and talk about this all after my meeting with the president. I will pass your recommendations on to him", Chief Stanišić said.

Chief Stanišić listened carefully to every word. Stanišić is extremely shrewd. He is very well informed and very balanced in his reasoning, which is a rare feature these days. He is also an advocate of peace, as are President Milošević and Minister Milutinović. However, by my standards, Chief Stanišić's most important personal trait, in addition to shrewdness, is his willingness to listen and really hear what is being said (another rarity these days). The Chief knows that President Milošević did not cause the sanctions imposed on his country. He knows that the catastrophic events in Krajina were due to the decisions of the leaders of the Serbs in Croatia to unite their forces with Radovan Karadžić. And these decisions in turn led to the chaos in the region and in the lives of thousands of people. Chief Stanišić knows that he and President Milošević have been trying for years to convince Radovan Karadžić, over and over again, to accept a peace agreement that would end the civil war in Bosnia. This would have saved thousands of lives, this would have prevented people from freezing in the winter because of the lack of energy products due to the sanctions. This would have preserved the economies of Serbia and Yugoslavia and prevented the development of a mentality that caused atrocities such as the one in Srebrenica.

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"Chris, lest I forget. I wrote a book about the ethnic turmoil in the Balkans. It will be published soon and I have been invited to present it in Greece. I will invite you to that presentation if you are in Greece," Koljević said. Suddenly, Koljević looked at me with a resigned expression on his face. "Chris, we have made some tragic mistakes. History will never forgive us. It was a terrible mistake not to accept the Contact Group's peace plan last year. I was the only member of our leadership who supported him. But Karadžić must not be expelled by force. There must be a better way. I believe that President Milošević will do that now, since he has been given the authority," Koljević said. "Nikola, I keep saying that the rejection of the Contact Group peace plan is one of the most harmful decisions ever made. It is going to persecute The Serbs in Bosnia for a long time yet. I don't need to tell you, Nikola, how many mindless things Karadžić and other senseless political and military leaders around him have done since this offer, the best the Serbs could ever get in Bosnia, was rejected. You know that The Serbs would have got almost 60% of Bosnian territory, all sanctions against Serbia and Yugoslavia would have been unconditionally lifted, thousands of lives would have been saved, and the horror of Srebrenica would not have happened. I agree that Karadžić should not be expelled by force. No killings, Nikola. The Serbs should stop protecting Karadžić, that would be a fair and a well-deserved solution," I told Koljević. "Unfortunately, you are absolutely right, Chris. To reject the Contact Group's peace plan was a disastrous decision. I have to tell you, Chris, that Milošević and Stanišić did their best to convince Karadžić to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. I myself tried everything, too. But we failed. Karadžić had the votes of the Parliament," Koljević said.

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There is no doubt that the devils, the lobbyists against peace and against Serbia in Dayton and beyond, will put Slobodan Milošević to the most difficult test. His perseverance, patience, will, determination and commitment to peace will be subjected to the greatest temptation. There are three people here who have an unfiltered access to President Milošević's ears and thoughts. Jovica Stanišić, Milan Milutinović and Chris Spirou. All three of us, collectively and individually, must redouble our efforts this weekend, just as we have done for the past 17 days, to help President Milošević achieve what he undertook more than a year and a half ago: to end, in direct cooperation with the Clinton administration, the civil war in Bosnia, restore peace in the Balkans and free his country from the unjust, punitive and economically catastrophic international sanctions.

Depending of the development of the situation, Minister Milutinović, Chief Stanišić and I must make sure that every request, every obstacle and possible provocation addressed to President Milošević, publicly or privately, is put in the correct perspective and resolved, so that he can persist. Whether he likes it or not, President Milošević must carry a banner that reads "Hope must survive". Unless in the next two, or maybe three days, President Milošević is exposed to some pressures and insults that will make him destroy the peace conference, the peace agreement will be signed. We must not allow something like that to happen. The agreement will be signed by next Tuesday, I said that a few days ago. If it's earlier, I won't be sorry. I am convinced of one thing: we will not leave Dayton without a peace agreement.

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In the Pakis restaurant, we saw the president of the "Bosnian Federation", Krešimir Zubak, having lunch alone. "Zubak is eating alone, Nebojša, I bet he misses his colleague, Minister of Foreign Affairs Šaćirbej," I told Vujović. "They are both in exile. Neither of them have given any contribution to the negotiations in all these weeks that we have been here, Chris. They haven't done anything positive, in any case," said Vujović. I told Vujović about my plans with President Milošević. "Make sure you speak to Chief Stanišić, Chris. That's a good strategy. The president must remain firm and focused. But above all, he must stay here. Christopher and Donilon will not leave Dayton without a signed peace agreement. I agree with you, Chris. You and Chief Stanišić are experts on not losing sight of the reward. You always say that," Chargé d'Affaires Vujović said.

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Vujović left me at 10:25 p.m. He returned at 11:00. "You were right, Mr. Presidential Adviser. We're not leaving tomorrow. The negotiations have just begun," Vujović said. "What's going on, Nebojša?" I asked. "I have just met with Chief Stanišić. He asked me to tell you that Holbrooke just grabbed President Milošević as they were walking. Holbrooke told the president that both Izetbegović and Tudjman were asking to meet with him. The president will meet with them in the next few hours. Chief Stanišić has asked for you to come to his apartment at 11:45 p.m.," Vujović said.

At 11:50 p.m. I went to see Chief Stanišić. "What's going on, Chief?" I asked. "Chris, my friend, as you advised, the president was honest and open. He gave them everything he could. It is now clear that the Muslims are playing at the behest of their protectors. There is no other justification for such behaviour on their part," the chief of security said. "The president must stick to his course. Each time he ends the meeting he should do it saying, 'I am ready to sign the agreement we have reached now and I will not leave here until everyone else is ready to do it as well,' " I said. "It is out of the question for us to return home and see the war in Bosnia continue and the sanctions on our country remain in full force. Our people will never understand if they accuse us of the failure of the peace conference," Chief Stanišić said.

"To let the war in Bosnia continue is not an option that Christopher can justify in Washington. Christopher and Milošević must hold on tight. If they do, the others will sooner or later capitulate," I told Chief Stanišić. "I agree. Peace has no alternative for either of them, Chris," Chief Stanišić said.

At 00:10 a.m. on Monday 20 November 1995, Bosnian Serb Army General Zdravko Tolimir entered Chief Stanišić's apartment. They talked for a few minutes in Serbian, and then the general handed Chief Stanišić a copy of the letter which the spokesman for the Assembly of Republika Srpska, Momčilo Krajišnik, had written to General Clark. Chief Stanišić handed me that letter and continued to talk to General Tolimir.

Krajišnik's letter, copies of which were sent to Igor Ivanov and General /Delapreux/, reads in one part: "This is just a short note by which we want to inform you that we have just seen (at 8:30) the latest version of the military document. I would like to inform you that our remarks, especially those related to the positioning of NATO troops on the territory of Republika Srpska, have been ignored. Do I have to remind you that there is a decision of the Assembly of Republika Srpska against the deployment of NATO forces on our territory?"

When General Tolimir left, Chief Stanišić and I discussed the letter. "What's this about, Chief?" I asked. "Common problems. The president has to cope with the Croats, the Muslims, the Serbs from Croatia, the Serbs from Bosnia, the Americans, the Europeans, with everyone! He has the hardest job in Dayton. By far the hardest! He has loads on his plate!" Chief Stanišić said. "Let's keep the hope for peace alive, Chief. The way things are going, you and I will have the hardest job in Dayton. To keep President Milošević going without him giving in under the

pressure of all those opposing interests," I told Chief Stanišić. "Let's keep in touch, Chris. This is going to be a long night, it seems," Chief Stanišić said.

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...Lipton, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury. Hill seemed drained and downcast. "How is it going, Chris?" I asked Hill. "We have big problems," Hill said angrily. "For God's sake, what's going on again, Chris?" I asked. "The map is now a huge problem," Hill said. "Bosnian Muslims again, right?" I asked. "I really don't want to talk about it. I was on my feet all night and I'm exhausted," Hill said. "People are trying. They are really trying, Chris," Lipton said. "Yes, David, most people are trying to finalise the peace agreement, but many are trying and doing everything they can to stop it," I said. "Yes, people are trying. The next three hours will be crucial," Chris Hill added. I almost told Chris Hill what was on my mind at that moment, but refrained from doing so. I knew that over the last twenty days Chris Hill had worked tirelessly to achieve this agreement. But, at that moment I had an inexplicable desire to tell him that we were paying the price for his boss's (Holbrooke) obsession to meet every absurd demand of the Bosnian Muslims during the last three weeks and fall prey to every political trick that Richard Perle could come up with for his Bosniak clients.

At lunch everyone seemed and acted distraught. One after another people asked me: "What the hell is going on?" Many of them asked me that. The Spanish ambassador, Louis Felipe Fernandez de la Pena, who was having lunch with a few members of the Contact Group, came to my table and asked: "What do you think is going on?" "Mr. Ambassador, Bosnian Muslim leaders are suffering from an acute form of spoiled children syndrome. You have allowed them, all of the European representatives here, but especially Holbrooke, to believe that they were the only victims of the Bosnian civil war. You have all contributed to Izetbegović, Silajdžić and Šaćirbej believing that they were the only factor to consider here at the peace negotiations. Tell your friends from the Contact Group to let Izetbegović and Silajdžić know that they have to abide by the agreement they reached yesterday with Milošević and Tuđman. And tell them that if they are expecting the U.S. marines to help them in Bosnia, after they bury the peace agreement here, that they are dreaming," I told the Spanish ambassador. "Do you think we will have an agreement in the end?" the ambassador asked. "Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We will have an agreement. You and the Contact Group may return to Europe empty-handed. But Warren Christopher will not go back to Washington without a peace agreement in his hands. Mark my words," I told the Spanish ambassador.

At 2:35 p.m. I returned to building 836. I went straight to the conference room, where the meeting of the delegation with President Milošević was still underway. I sat next to Goran Milinović, near the entrance. Two minutes after I sat down, a member of the American secret service quietly entered. "Secretary Holbrooke is here and wants to see President Milošević right away," he told Goran Milinović, the head of President Milošević's cabinet. "OK," Milinović said.

Milinović went to inform President Milošević. "Hi Chris," President Milošević greeted me, shaking my hand as he was exiting the conference room. He looked well, composed and bright-eyed. Minister Milutinović and Chief Stanišić continued to talk for another ten minutes. To me that was all Serbian Swahili!

At 2:50 p.m. Jovica Stanišić, Chief of Yugoslav National Security Service, and myself, found ourselves in his apartment. "Things are not going well at all, Hristo, my friend. We will have problems with the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Muslims have new and drastic demands for Sarajevo," Chief Stanišić noted. "Chief, we have to help the President stay focused, and we can't lose sight of the goal. Our goal is peace. The leaders of Bosnian Serbs who are present

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here have had a chance to keep 60% of Bosnia under their complete control with unconditional lifting of all sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia. They rejected that peace plan, as you well know, although President Milošević and you begged and pleaded with them. And since they caused the suffering of Serbia and Montenegro under continued brutal international sanctions, and since they caused unbelievable issues and suffering of Serbs in Croatia, and since they committed heinous crimes, one after another, in Bosnia, exposing Serbian civilians there to suffering at the hands of NATO's brutal acts, Krajišnik and his team now have the audacity to start creating problems for President Milošević again? Are we now again in a situation where Karadžić and Krajišnik can put a veto on the peace agreement? Is that what you're saying?"

"Chief, this is the last and final attempt of anti-peace, anti-Serbian and anti-Milošević forces to create trouble so that peace negotiations would fail. They only have one goal when issuing their new demands. To force Slobodan Milošević to finally say NO, which would cause negotiations to fail. They are dying to read the following headlines in the newspaper: As expected, the Serbian dictator, Slobodan Milošević, buried the peace negotiations. Some TV shows are already reporting that negotiations are at a dead end due to the new territorial demands of the Serbs. Their propaganda machinery has already begun churning gossip that the Serbs and Milošević are causing all last-minute problems in Dayton. Chief, the strategy of anti-peace, anti-Serbian and anti-Milošević forces at this moment is very transparent and clear. It is called a desperate move. The war mongers and their "Dark Prince," Richard Perle, never expected Slobodan Milošević to stay the course. They didn't even dream that Milošević would solve his problems with Tuđman in short order, or that he would veto every objection raised by the Bosnian Serbs here. And what is worst for the war mongers, never, not even in their wildest dreams, could they imagine that Bill Clinton would send his entire national security team to Dayton, and transfer his Secretary of State to the Wright-Patterson Air Force base until the peace agreement is reached. Not even in a dream!

Now they are stuck. And what is their only chance to prevent the signing of the General Agreement now? For Izetbegović and Silajdžić to demand concessions from Milošević, which, if he accepts them, will provoke Karadžić and Krajišnik to react with violence and thus cause the peace negotiations to collapse. And that's what's happening now. Bosnian Muslims demanded for the NATO peace-keeping forces to be stationed in the Republic of Serbia. President Milošević agreed. Krajišnik reacted, but not with the kind of force that would sink the peace agreement. The President dealt with the matter. Now Izetbegović and Silajdžić have raised the stakes. Now they are demanding the Serbian part of Sarajevo. I am certain that Perle and Ischinger convinced them that Bosnian Serbs would never allow Milošević to hand over even a foot of their part of Sarajevo. And if he dared to do it, that they would start a war against everyone, including Serbia."

"Let me tell you something, Chief, I don't know what President Milošević will do about the new demand of Bosnian Muslims. I only know why that demand was made. You know the configuration of the maps better than anyone. If the new demand is a key strategic concession that won't actually contribute to peace, I think that the President should reject it. If this demand is based on sentimental value, then peace and the peace agreement should be our choice. Regardless of what President Milošević decides, he will have the support of Secretary Christopher. Christopher won't allow Bosnian Muslims to ruin the general agreement, Chief. Despite everything. At the beginning of the peace negotiations, we had Izetbegović, Silajdžić and Šaćirbej going against Karadžić, Mladić and Krajišnik. Now we have the situation where Bill Clinton, Warren Christopher and Richard Holbrooke are going against Bob Dole, Newt Gingrich and Richard Perle. I will allow myself to make a prediction, Chief Stanišić. If Secretary Christopher convinces President Milošević to agree to the latest demand of Bosnian Muslims, and if the President agrees to the latest separation line, which gives the Muslims control over the Serbian part of Sarajevo, also if Christopher again announces that a general

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agreement has been reached, Bosnian Muslims will find a reason that same day why the agreement was unacceptable. I am afraid, Chief, that neither the Bosnian Muslims nor the Bosnian Serbs who are here want to cross the finish line walking. They will both have to be dragged across. And in the end, they will force Secretary Christopher and President Milošević to drag them. Unfortunately, we are at that stage of peace negotiations. Chief, you and I have to prevent President Milošević from reacting negatively. He has to stay focused, determined and positive. Under no circumstances can he allow it to look like he was the one who caused the Peace Conference to fail, even if he's the only one who signs Christopher's peace agreement. He must force Christopher to drag the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs, the leaders, the fundamentalists, across the finish line. President Milošević must walk through the finish line with his head raised high," I told Chief Stanišić. "I agree with you, Hristo. That's what they are trying to do. They want us to kill ourselves among each other and stop the peace negotiations. The President will make the final decision. We have to help him stay clear-headed, focused and positive. Like you said. This strategy has been producing results so far," Chief Stanišić agreed.

At 3:15 p.m. the meeting with President Milošević resumed. The President returned from the meeting with Secretary Holbrooke. All representatives of Bosnian Serbs were present. I left the meeting at 4 p.m. The doors to all the rooms in the hallway were open. Countless aids were watching international news on TV as if hypnotised.

I went back to my apartment. CNN was reporting that "the sudden Serbian demands put forward at the last minute were threatening to cause the collapse of the agreement." "So this is where we are," I thought to myself, "Šaćirbej is spinning his lies, and CNN is reporting them verbatim." CNN also reported that "one of the dignitaries at peace negotiations said that not everything would be lost if peace negotiations failed." That "dignitary" believed that "after a few weeks of 'cooling off' the parties would be able to start negotiating again."

"There is no limit to stupidity!" I thought to myself while watching CNN news. If peace negotiations collapse, the situation in Bosnia will get so heated in a few weeks that there won't be anyone left to negotiate with there."

At 4:20 p.m., after finishing my notes for the day until that moment, I thought I would collapse myself. The marathon race for peace had taken its toll. I went over to Nebojša Vujović's apartment, two doors down from me. "Mr. Ambassador, I need a brutal American coffee, the stronger the better," I said to Vujović. "Things must be more serious than I thought if you are asking for a cup of American coffee," Vujović noted. "Nebojša, I need a stimulant. I have a feeling that the hours ahead of us will be like sitting in a pressure cooker, and unforgettable. If I remember correctly, the plan was for us to travel to Belgrade soon. Is that plan still in place?" I asked Vujović. "Nobody really knows when we are coming or going. The meetings taking place right now are of critical importance. Let's have a quick coffee and go out to see what we can do to save what can be saved," said Vujović.

At 4:35 p.m. I met with Goran Milinović. "Mr. Chris, five minutes ago the President received a new proposal for the territorial division, a new map, from President Tuđman. Secretary Christopher personally brought the new plan to President Milošević. Minister Militunović, Chief Stanišić and three Bosnian Serb leaders are meeting with the President in Minister Milutinović's apartment and reviewing it. Secretary Christopher is waiting in President Milošević's apartment," Milinović told me.

At 4:45 p.m. President Milošević left Minister Milutinović's apartment and went back to his. A minute later, President Milošević and Secretary Christopher left building no. 836 and went over to building no. 835, where President Tuđman and the Croatian delegation are staying, in order to meet with President Tuđman.

At 5 p.m. the Serbian delegation took a 15-minute break. At 5:15 p.m. the meeting of the delegation resumed. Bosnian Serb leaders came to room 318 one by one to attend the

meeting of the delegation. I was standing in front of the conference room, at the entrance. The faces of Bosnian Serb delegates were as if carved out of stone. No smile, no trace of their emotional state. They were calm and seemed determined. President Bulatović presided over the meeting.

At 5:20 p.m. President Bulatović came out and walked over to President Milošević's apartment. Two minutes later, President Milošević went over to the conference room accompanied by President Bulatović and Minister Milutinović. Before entering he greeted me by saying, "Hi Chris, my friend." He seemed determined. His face was also as if carved out of stone. Behind his back, President Bulatović gave me the thumbs up. I couldn't figure out what the thumbs up sign could mean at that critical moment, except that President Milošević had decided to accept Tuđman's new territorial proposal, which would undoubtedly provoke a negative reaction among the Bosnian Serb delegation.

President Milošević started the meeting. Since the discussion took place exclusively in Serbian, I went back to my apartment. At 5:30 p.m. CNN news reported the "media in Bosnia" were reporting that "the negotiations in Dayton had broken down." As I listened, it occurred to me that Šaćirbej was reporting home the opposite of what was actually going on in Dayton.

At 5:35 p.m. Captain David Miller came to my apartment, he was a liaison officer for the Serbian delegation at the air force base. "Delegate Spirou, the bus that will take the Serbian delegates and staff to the airport will be here on time, at 5:45 p.m.," Captain Miller told me. "Are you sure of that, David?" I asked. "I was told the bus was supposed to be here on Monday at 5:45 p.m. Nobody told me that the initial order to leave for the airport on Monday at 5:45 p.m. had been changed," Captain Miller answered. "David, I suggest that you find Nebojša Vujović and get the new orders. I don't think we will be leaving soon, even though all our luggage is already on the planes that are ready to take off," I informed Captain Miller. While we were talking, CNN reported that "according to some high-ranking American officials, negotiations in Dayton are advancing one step forward, two steps back." "That's what I was referring to, David. Only Christopher can announce that the negotiations are finished, and he is still negotiating," I told Captain Miller.

At 5:15 p.m. the meeting in room 318 finished. President Milošević and Minister Milutinović went over to the President's apartment. The Bosnian Serb delegates went to attend a meeting with President Bulatović in his apartment on the floor above.

Nebojša Vujović came to see me at 5:50 p.m.. "We are not leaving. We cancelled the bus and are waiting. I've just informed Captain Miller," Vujović informed me. "Nebojša Vujović, who told you nothing would happen before Tuesday?" I asked the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, who looked tired. "You. You keep repeating that," Vujović said. "Now none of us have a shaving kit or a toothbrush," I told Vujović. "We will leave as soon as we catch a lucky break," Vujović added with a smile. It was the first smile I had seen that entire day.

All of a sudden, almost everyone gathered in the hallway of building number 836. Tired, worried, nervous, confused, disappointed, depressed, and eager to go home. Some were exhibiting all these symptoms! But, they were all there. By 6:45 p.m. they had all disappeared from the hallway. Most of them ran out of money. Most of them had to find a place to spend the night without even the basic means of personal hygiene.

At 6:50 p.m. I was in my apartment working on my notes and trying to draw some final conclusions. Nebojša Vujović ran in with a huge smile on his face. "A good deal is in the making, Chris. We will definitely finish tomorrow. I can't believe you predicted this all last week," Vujović said. "Everything is evolving around Sarajevo, Nebojša, don't you think?" I asked him. "Yes, the new proposal for territorial division put forward by President Tuđman, and personally presented by Secretary Christopher. Like you said, Hristo Spirović. Tuesday, and it will happen," Nebojša Vujović noted, shaking my hand joyfully. "Nebojša, let's go get

some items of personal hygiene so I don't have to sleep in your room tonight," I said. "Let's," he agreed.

At 7:45 p.m. we reconvened in building 836. At 7:50 p.m. President Milošević held a short meeting with the delegation, before retreating to his apartment to get some rest. It had been a brutal day, especially for President Milošević and Secretary Christopher. At 8:40 p.m. a large group of us from the Serbian delegation without any Bosnian Serbs went to dinner at the Officers' Club. The atmosphere had changed 100% since that afternoon. Everyone was tired, and most of us were exhausted; most of us had no pyjamas or toothbrushes; but jokes were flying around, people were smiling and laughing heartily, which cheered everyone up.

At 10:45 p.m. Chief Stanišić went to brief the Bosnian Serb delegates on the final agreement regarding Sarajevo. At 11:05 p.m. Nebojša Vujović came to see me. "You won't believe what just happened. I was with Chief Stanišić as he was briefing the Bosnian Serb delegates about the new territorial lines for Sarajevo. After Chief left, Momčilo Krajišnik collapsed. He refuses to believe it. I don't think that Bosnian Serb leaders will sign this agreement," Vujović observed. "Nebojša, if President Milošević, Secretary Christopher and President Tuđman agree on the new territorial map for Bosnia, President Milošević will push it through among the Bosnian Serb leaders, and Christopher will impose it on the Bosnian Muslim leaders. Perhaps they will have to push them across the finish line, but we are there. The finish line is here. And tomorrow they will cross the finish line and sign what they agreed to today. That's my prognosis, Nebojša," I told Vujović.

At 11:10 p.m. Minister Milutinović called me. "Chris, come over, I have good news," Minister Milutinović said. I was faster than a bullet. "We have the Agreement in our hands, Chris," the Foreign Minister said, visibly happy. I cried. "Thank goodness, Milan! Thank goodness that reason and peace prevailed," I said to Minister Milutinović, hugged him and kissed him three times, as is the Serbian way.

"Milan, tell me what you know about the final moves behind the scenes that made this happen," I asked Minister Milutinović. "We were told that after Tuđman agreed to a compromise regarding the borders proposal, Christopher informed the White House. President Clinton called Secretary Christopher and told him that he wants the final agreement this evening. Christopher gave the Muslim leaders until midnight to review all the maps. I hope the Muslim leaders got the message. Americans are now resolved to get this done. They are no longer negotiating with us or the Croats. Now the Bosnian Muslims are the problem," noted Minister Milutinović.

"Milan, they succeeded! President Clinton and President Milošević got it done! I have been talking about it for a year and a half, you and I have been working on it nonstop. Day and night we have been working on it, so that President Clinton and President Milošević would get it done. End the war in Bosnia, lift the sanctions on Yugoslavia and bring peace back to the Balkans. And they did it today, Milan! I am shaking with happiness and pride. Milan, the Bosnian Muslim leaders are holding in their hands the last and the best offer from Secretary Christopher. If they and their aids behind the scenes miscalculate and try to undermine the agreement reached today, they will suffer the consequences of their actions. And they will be forced to sign it. Warren Christopher is not Richard Holbrooke, Milan.

And none of them are President Clinton, on whose behalf Warren Christopher has been negotiating for over a week. If Izetbegović, Silajdžić and Perle offend Secretary Christopher the second time in 24 hours, you will see how Christopher will deal with it."

"If you ask me, Milan, Bosnian Muslim leaders and Perle are capable to trying to obstruct the agreement one more time, I say they are and they probably will, before the deadline. We will know in an hour or so, like you said. But in the end, they will be forced to sign on the dotted line and peace will prevail. Today, with great political sacrifice, President Milošević gave Secretary Christopher what he wanted in order to achieve peace. Secretary

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Christopher will give President Milošević what he needs tomorrow. The agreement that puts an end to the civil war in Bosnia, lifts the sanctions on Yugoslavia and brings peace to the Balkans,” I told Minister Milutinović. “Oh God, I hope so,” the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, exhausted.

We agreed that today's choppy waters were the worst we've ever experienced. We booth looked like we were about to have a heart attack. “Will the delegates of Bosnian Serbs sign the final agreement, Milan?” I asked him on the way out. “They will. I think they will. Although, who knows with them. I will call you when I find out what the Muslims decided,” Minister Milutinović said.

I am in my room. It's almost midnight, Monday, 20 November 1995. It will soon be Tuesday, 21 November – exactly three weeks since our arrival in Dayton, Ohio, USA, for the start of indirect negotiations. It seems like we've been here for ages. I could write a book about these twenty days I voluntarily spent in prison for the sake of peace. The prison is called the Wright-Patterson Air Force base, Dayton, Ohio, USA. I will only say a couple of things now. I say the game is over. There is no going back now. Not a chance! Clinton and Milošević succeeded. And, as I was saying from day one, this could only be done through a close cooperation between Clinton and Milošević. As for the obstructionist team of Bosnian Muslims, their games must end. They will either reject the proposed agreement tonight or wait until tomorrow morning to announce their decision. Whatever they decide, someone should let them know their hours are numbered. Their obstructionist party is over. They should get out their pens. The signing of the peace agreement is next. And I, although terribly tired, won't get ready for bed yet. I will only relax a bit on the sofa and wait for Minister Milutinović's call.

I stretched out on the sofa and dozed off. At 1:15 a.m. on Tuesday, 21 November 1995, Nebojša Vujović knocked on my door. “You won't believe it, Chris. Bosnian Muslims rejected the final agreement proposal that Secretary Christopher gave them,” Vujović said. “How did you find out, Nebojša?” I asked. “The American team came to inform Minister Milutinović. He called you to come over to his apartment to talk about it,” Vujović said. “Who came, Nebojša? Holbrooke?” I asked. “No, General Clark, Chris Hill, Rudi Perina and James Pardue, as far as I know,” Vujović responded.

I went to see Minister Milutinović. “Does President Milošević know about the decision of Bosnian Muslims?” I asked Minister Milutinović. “No, the President is sleeping,” Minister Milutinović informed me. “And President Bulatović?” I asked him. “I informed him. He said that in the morning we had to talk about it again. He went to sleep,” Minister Milutinović said.

“Milan, this can't wait until the morning. We have to come up with a strategy tonight, which we will use tomorrow morning. Propaganda against President Milošević and the Serbs will start from early morning, on all fronts. They will blame President Milošević and the Serbs for the collapse of the peace negotiations. This is what I propose. Tonight we will inform President Milošević of the decision of Bosnian Muslims. President Milošević should tell Holbrooke tonight that early tomorrow morning Secretary Christopher needs to send him the agreement they reached today. He should also tell Hollbrooke that he had ordered his staff to prepare a press conference as testimony of the signing ceremony. Without informing Holbrooke about it, President Milošević must call President Tuđman first thing tomorrow morning and propose to him that he joins him in the signing of the General Agreement they accepted today. Otherwise, all agreements between Yugoslavia and Croatia will be at risk. When Tuđman agrees, and he will, they should call Christopher and inform him of their joint decision. Let Secretary Christopher inform Izetbegović and Silajdžić of that at breakfast. Let Christopher tell Izetbegović and Silajdžić that is in the midst of organising the signing of the agreement by Milošević and Tuđman, and you'll see how fast they will decide to join them,” I told Minister Milutinović.

Translation

“I agree. The President should take a firm and positive approach, sign the Agreement and go on the offensive. I will go and pass on the news and our proposals to him. I think there is an international precedent for the unilateral signing of the Agreement. I also believe that Tuđman will agree to join us. Christopher will come under a lot of pressure not to exclude Izetbegović,” Minister Milutinović noted. “This isn't a complicated matter, Milan. It's really simple. President Milošević decides to sign the agreement he reached with Secretary Christopher. President Milošević calls President Tuđman to join him. In the end, the last agreement was Tuđman's proposal. After that President Milošević and President Tuđman ask Secretary Christopher to prepare the signing ceremony, with Izetbegović or without him. Let Secretary Christopher figure out what to do with Izetbegović. If President Milošević and President Tuđman take these simple steps by tomorrow morning, we will have a peace agreement before the clock strikes noon tomorrow. I mean – today,” I said to Minister Milutinović. “OK, Chris. We'll talk in the morning. I will go see the President in ten minutes,” Minister Milutinović told me.

I went straight to Chief Stanišić's apartment. He was awake and angry. “Those liars. They have no shame! Giving one's word means nothing to them. They lied to Secretary Christopher twice in 24 hours. And they have been lying to us for three weeks now,” Chief Stanišić said. “Chief, President Milošević has to sign the Agreement he negotiated with Secretary Christopher.

Call President Milošević on the secure line you use to communicate with him,” I told Chief Stanišić. “Mister President, it's Chris. I am sorry to wake you up. The Muslim leaders rejected Christopher's plan. Milan will come to brief you. He knows what my position is and what I am suggesting and will explain it to you. He doesn't know that I am calling you. You will pretend that you are hearing it from him for the first time. But you can't allow them to blame you for the failure of the peace negotiations. You should send someone to get Holbrooke tonight and tell him, not ask him, to tell Secretary Christopher to organise the signing ceremony of the agreement that you and President Tuđman reached with him today. In the morning, call President Tuđman and ask him to join you in signing. Then, you and Tuđman should inform Christopher of your joint decision. Christopher won't allow Izetbegović to put a veto on the peace agreement that he negotiated. That's the last stop on the path to the agreement,” I told President Milošević. “OK, Chris,” President Milošević replied. “I will brief Chief Stanišić in detail as well, Mr. President. Good night,” I said to President Milošević.

I spent the next 15 minutes discussing the details with Chief Stanišić. “I agree with you. If we do it calmly, positively and firmly, we will succeed. Like you said, we will have an Agreement to sign tomorrow. Go and get a few hours of sleep, my friend. We will walk the last steps to peace together,” Chief Stanišić said. I gave him a big hug the Serbian way and asked him to do everything he can to prevent peace from slipping through our hands.

At 2:45 a.m. I took a quick shower and went to bed. It is now 21 November 1995, 3:05 a.m..

Tuesday, 21 November 1995

At 7:15 a.m. I woke up, alarmed by the situation with the peace agreement. I had gone to bed much after 3 a.m. and got less than four hours of sleep. I was uncomfortable, I was naked. I didn't have any clean clothes to put on in the morning, because my suitcases had already been loaded onto the presidential plane, ready to fly to Belgrade.

The tension of yesterday's events and the anxiety over the decisions that had to be made resulted in me having to wash my underwear by hand and put it on the radiator to dry overnight.

Translation

This wasn't the first time I had to do this. It happened before when I visited Belgrade the first time to meet President Milošević, in the spring of 1994. At that time Serbia was under sanctions and there were no commercial flights to Serbia. I travelled to Serbia through Rumania. The Rumanian airline that flew from Athens in Greece to Timișoara in Rumania lost my luggage.

The flight from Athens, the protests at the airport in Timișoara, the search for my luggage, all of that forced me to wash the underwear I had by hand and spread it out over the radiators overnight at the villa at which I was staying. I did not have any clean clothes then either.

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“In my opinion, Nebojša, Izetbegović, Silajdžić, Šaćirbej and their associates were stunned when President Milošević and President Tuđman completed the general peace proposal with a solution for Sarajevo and a corridor for Brčko. They didn't expect Tuđman and Milošević to come to an agreement about Sarajevo. Just like Krajišnik was stunned when Stanišić informed the delegates of Bosnian Serbs of the Milošević – Tuđman agreement, they were stunned when they heard about the same from Christopher. Then Secretary Christopher approved the Milošević – Tuđman agreement and President Clinton supported it, leaving the Bosnian Muslim leaders alone and naked. Despite all the hand-picked advisors who had come to Dayton with one objective only – to prevent the reaching of the peace agreement.

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I thought how brave, humane and instantaneous President Milošević's response was to Secretary Fraser's request in the spring of 1995, to help free over 400 U.N. peace keepers being held hostage by the Bosnian Serb warlord, Radovan Karadžić, in the mountains of Republika Srpska, and how President Milošević's Chief of National Security, Jovica Stanišić, and his brave commando units, risked their lives in the hills of Republika Srpska for over a month, so that they could free the hostages one by one until the very last of them had been freed, and enable them to return to their families safely. I remembered the conversation I had with Congressman Bill Richardson in Washington after I personally handed him President Milošević's letter in which he invited him to Belgrade, and his immediate positive response to the invitation. I remember how disappointed Congressman Richardson was when the Assistant State Secretary Richard Holbrooke said that the State Department was not looking favourably on his meeting with Slobodan Milošević until they got “something concrete from Milošević.” Something like the recognition of Bosnia as the new national state with Muslim fundamentalist leadership.

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“Hristo Spirović, my friend, we have peace. Thank God, we finally have peace. Get ready. I am coming to pick you up at 12:15 p.m. and we will have lunch at the Officers' Club,” Chief Stanišić told me.

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... what implications that had, not only for our consciousness but also for the possibility of spreading the conflict, which existed.

Translation

It's a fact that these leaders decided to end it and enable the people in Bosnia to have a peaceful Christmas and a peaceful future, something we should be very, very grateful for.

"Thank you very much."

At precisely 12:15 p.m. Chief Stanišić came to get me. I have never seen him this happy. A quiet, thoughtful and reserved chief of Yugoslav National Security was glowing with happiness. He gave me a big hug the Serbian way and kissed me three times. Chief was holding me by the shoulders and looking me straight in the eyes. Then he said slowly, thoughtfully and firmly:

"My dear friend, we have peace. Peace that we have worked on so hard. I know, better than anyone else, everything you did to help us. Hristo Spirović. The people of Serbia, the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the citizens of Montenegro are grateful to you for what you did. Peace is the only thing that offers people security, Hristo Spirović. War and killing are for uncivilized people," Chief Stanišić said.

"Chief, I am so proud to have been the Serbian delegate at the peace negotiations and that you are my chief of national security. I agree with you 100%. Peace means security. And peaceful co-existence means security for everyone in the Balkans. Let's get something to eat. Let's have a glass of wine to celebrate peace and talk about what will happen later this afternoon, after we leave Dayton," I told Chief Stanišić.

"Don't worry, my friend. I told them to put us next to each other at the signing ceremony," Chief Stanišić said with a big smile on his face.

At lunch, Chief Stanišić and I rejoiced in the historic moment. We talked about how difficult the negotiations were. We agreed that the peaceful solution for Bosnia, or any other area in the Balkans, would not have happened without Secretary Christopher's subtle perseverance and determination or President Milošević's patience and commitment to the peaceful solution of the conflict in the Balkans.

Chief and I also briefly discussed the 400 U.N. hostages he freed in Bosnia last spring. I have always wanted to know how he managed to persuade the radical war lord Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić to free the U.N. peacekeepers they were holding hostage.

"Chief, let me turn on the tape recorder, I want to record, for posterity, a few things about your adventures while freeing U.N. hostages. I know that you guys are allergic to recordings, but Spirović is Spirović," I told Chief Stanišić.

"OK, Kristo, my friend. You can turn on the tape recorder. It is on all the time anyway and you are holding a pen in your hand. All I can promise you today is that one day in the near future, I will tell you everything about the operation of freeing U.N. hostages. I will tell you everything about the peacekeepers that Radovan Karadžić had tied to the trees, sticks and telephone poles throughout the complex of his headquarters in Republika Srpska. He captured them and tied them up to protect himself and his leaders from NATO bombs. The only thing I can tell you now is that every peacekeeper was safely brought out of Bosnia. It was hell to get it done. But we got it done. None of the hostages were injured. They all returned to their countries and families safe and free. That was my mission, and I received instructions to do it from the political leadership in my country. You know that. You were present when the orders were given," Chief Stanišić said.

"Chief, I wonder what those United Nations soldiers who were held hostage are doing today, and how many of them had seen President Clinton's announcement from the White House," I told Chief Stanišić.

"They are probably at home, in their countries, living peacefully with their families," answered Chief Stanišić.

"Chief, none of them will ever find out what President Milošević, you and your brave commandos did to get them out of Republika Srpska safely. Unless you tell the world what happened. They all probably think that Richard Holbrooke and the NATO generals under

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which they served freed them from hell. I know how the operation of freeing the hostages began, what you said, I was there. You know the rest. I look forward to the day when you will tell me the whole story," I told Chief Stanišić.

"I promise to tell you the whole story one day, Hristo Spirović. And I always keep my promises," Chief Stanišić added.

Chief Stanišić and I talked about the implementation stage of the Peace Agreement, once it's officially signed.

"What do you think, Chief, how difficult will the implementation be?" I asked.

"Tuđman will keep all his promises. Both in Eastern Slavonia and in Bosnia. The United States and Germany will force Bosnian Muslims to keep theirs. As for us, we will keep all the promises we made," said Chief Stanišić.

"What about the Bosnian Serbs, Chief? Their delegates here refused to accept what President Milošević promised in the general peace plan. Especially the Sarajevo compromise. I know what happened when you told them about the Tuđman – Christopher compromise," I said to Chief Stanišić.

"When we return to Belgrade, we will assemble the leaders of Bosnian Serbs and inform them of the decisions adopted at indirect negotiations. You can be sure that after that meeting they will join us in implementing every single provision of the general peace agreement. They won't reject peace this time, Kristo. They have done it too many times in the past. It's over now. Peace won, they lost. We have silenced the weapons in Bosnia and Croatia forever. Thousands of innocent lives will be saved, and the crazy war lords, as you call them, on all sides, will pay for their inhumane acts," Chief Stanišić added.

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Chief Stanišić was right. Only peace can ensure the safety of people.

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I shook Chief Stanišić's hand and hugged him.

"This was God's will," he whispered. "We have peace," I told the Yugoslav Chief of National Security.

"Yes, my friend," he whispered. "We have peace. Now we have to work really hard to keep it."

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... Milošević. President Milošević was reading them out loud. The only thing I understood was Chirac, Kohl, Yeltsin and Major.

"What's happening, Chief?" I asked Jovica Stanišić, who was sitting next to me.

"The President is reading the wires he received from world leaders who are congratulating him on the peace agreement," Chief Stanišić said.

At 5:30 we boarded the President's plane again for the last leg of our trip to Belgrade. I fell asleep instantly!

At 9:15 President Milošević came into our cabin. He took the chairman of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Assembly, Momčilo Krajišnik, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksa Buha, with him to a separate cabin. Nikola Koljević, the Vice-President of the Bosnian-Serbian government and I sat down to discuss the peace agreement.

"What do you think about the final peace agreement, Nikola?" I asked.

Translation

“It’s generally ok, Chris. But there are some parts we have to work on before the final signing at the Paris Peace Conference,” Koljević said.

“Will your group support the peace agreement, Nikola?” I asked him.

“We have to remain quiet, Chris. We can’t say anything to avoid trouble. It would be best if we analysed it and worked behind the scenes on improving it,” Koljević answered.

“Will Krajišnik and Karadžić agree?” I asked him.

“What else can they do? Milošević has no intention of undermining the peace. And he won’t. As far as I understand, we won’t be allowed to leave Belgrade until Karadžić comes and signs the agreement. I think that’s what is being discussed with Krajišnik and Buha in that cabin. Milošević told me that Stanišić will be in charge of a complete implementation of the peace agreement and the protection of the peacekeepers. All we can do is cooperate with Milošević on the three or four provisions of the peace agreement, and if possible, improve them. Karadžić marginalized himself completely. He lied and embarrassed Milošević so many times that I am afraid to even attend tomorrow’s meeting. But we have no choice. We have to attend and sign the peace agreement. Karadžić betrayed Milošević and Stanišić so many times during the last three peace agreements that he is now in deep sh., as you Americans would say it. Krajišnik is another fanatic, even worse than Karadžić. He is also out of the game. We are all out of the game, Chris,” Koljević said.

Koljević and I agreed to meet in Belgrade over the next few days before I travel to Athens.

Jovica Stanišić and I found seats on the plane where we had complete privacy.

“Chief, as far as I understood what President Milošević told me and what Koljević confirmed just now, you will coordinate the implementation of the peace agreement. Let me just tell you what I think President Clinton is facing right now and what the potential dangers from his side are. First, German, Turkish and Republican propaganda will try to discredit President Clinton’s decision to impose the peace agreement on the undecisive Bosnian Muslim war commanders in Dayton. They will assert that President Milošević won’t keep his promise to persuade the Bosnian Serb war commanders and the Serbian rebels in Eastern Slavonia to comply with the obligations he accepted, that will be another of their propaganda theories.

Above all, Chief, they will be questioning President Milošević’s determination and ability to offer full protection to the American members of the peacekeeping force, which is needed for the full implementation of the peace agreement. And of course, the political discussions in the capitals of members countries of the international community, not to mention the halls and courtrooms of the War Crimes Tribunal, will also be dominated by the question of President Karadžić’s participation in the elections in Bosnia, which is one of the requirements of the peace agreement.

To sum it up, it looks like you have your work cut out for you, Chief. I don’t think that you or President Milošević have room for even the smallest mistake or oversight, especially when it comes to the complete safety of all peacekeeping forces. Every provision and every topic of the peace agreement must be implemented carefully, decisively and fully,” I told Chief Stanišić at the beginning of our conversation.

“My dear friend, Hristo Spirović. As always, you know how to put things into perspective. First, you know better than anyone what kind of effort we put into achieving this peace agreement. As far as we are concerned, we were lied to. On the 21st day in Dayton, we were accused, tricked and betrayed by the Serbian fundamentalist leaders from Republika Srpska, many of whom are on the plane with us now. The European leaders who are against Serbia and Milošević, together with the Republicans from the U.S. Congress who are against Clinton, have been profiting from the crazy behaviour of Karadžić and his associates for years, and are punishing the people of Serbia and Montenegro with sanctions that have crippled our economy. They have turned every Serb into a prisoner of the crazed and inhumane behaviour

Translation

of Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Momčilo Krajišnik and many others in Republika Srpska.

And you should know, Hristo: We will implement fully every phase of the peace agreement we signed. We will fully protect the peace keeping forces sent by the international community to assist us in the implementation of the peace agreement. And we will make sure that no American civilians or military personnel get hurt. The same goes for all other peacekeeping forces as well. We know that every opponent of peace and of Serbia on this planet is hoping the Serbs will cause the loss of American lives in the Balkans. We won't do them a favor in that respect, Hristo. But, do you think the Congress will approve President Clinton's request to send American peacekeepers to Bosnia and Croatia?" Stanišić asked.

"They will, Chief. In the end President Clinton as the commander in chief will get authorization for it from the Congress. You on your end have to ensure that no peacekeepers are hurt after their sending is approved. The United States elections are coming up in 1996. Bill Clinton won't be able to survive politically if caskets carrying American peacekeepers start arriving at American airports or their funerals are shown on TV. It's crazy, Chief, but President Clinton's opponents have only one hope in their political arsenal and that is a big failure of Clinton's foreign policy. And the Balkans are one of the hot spots with a great potential. Bill Clinton is unbeatable when it comes to economy and the domestic affairs. His opponents are hoping that the Balkans will be Clinton's political burial ground," I told Chief Stanišić.

"Well, Hristo, the Balkan region, especially Bosnia and Croatia, are full of crazy people who are ready to undermine the peace agreement and ruin it. It is a big undertaking, a huge one, to ensure full implementation of the peace agreement and full protection of the peacekeepers who are coming to help us implement it. Carefully and methodically, we will succeed. I will work 24 hours a day to ensure that what we agreed to when President Milošević put his signature on it, is implemented, and that what I was entrusted with is done right and honourably. Serbia, its President, Foreign Minister and State Security Service are fully committed to the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Dayton, and to ensuring complete security of the peacekeepers, who will be sent there for the purpose of its implementation," Chief Stanišić said.

"Chief, Nikola Koljević mentioned something about them not traveling to Belgrade through Republika Srpska for a while. What's that about?" I asked Chief Stanišić.

"Well, Hristo, we have to force them to sign the peace agreement that we reached in Dayton. President Milošević asked me to make sure that Karadžić arrives in Belgrade by tomorrow, and to place these guys into house arrest until he arrives from Republika Srpska. I contacted Karadžić and expect him to be in Belgrade by Thursday – tomorrow. However, Karadžić has a habit of not keeping his promises. He lied to us so many times that I stopped counting. I therefore arranged for all Bosnian Serb delegates to stay at a secure villa in Belgrade tonight, where they will meet with their leader, Radovan Karadžić, tomorrow. We are expected to meet with all of them around noon on Thursday, which is tomorrow, and for Karadžić and others to sign the Dayton peace agreement at that time," Chief Stanišić informed me.

"I would call it deluxe detention, Chief. Except for perhaps Koljević, others don't deserve it. You also need to consider the political future of Karadžić, Krajišnik and the fundamentalist lady Vice-President, Biljana Plavšić. Especially the future of Karadžić and Krajišnik. They shouldn't be allowed to be a part of the new political configuration of Republika Srpska or Bosnia. That's not to say that Plavšić is any better," I told Chief Stanišić.

"Step by step, my friend, Hristo Spirović. When we cross the river in a boat carrying Bosnian Serbian leadership for the elections in new Bosnia in 1996, Radovan Karadžić won't be in that boat. Neither will any of his associates. With their senseless acts, Karadžić and his

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fundamentalist group have given up any right to be part of the political leadership of Republika Srpska. Hristo, please work with Milutinović on getting the sanctions lifted. They have to be lifted, as it was agreed in Dayton,” Chief Stanišić suggested.

“Chief, it looks like we’ll have as much to do with the implementation of the peace agreement as we had with reaching it. Are we going to get a break in the meantime?” I asked Chief Stanišić.

“No, my friend. There is no break for the Balkans. At least not for the agents of peace, the peacekeepers and us, who must ensure the implementation of the peace agreement. In the Balkans, Hristo, the peace-loving people and the people who want a peaceful co-existence don't get a break. Unfortunately,” Chief Stanišić added.

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Chief Stanišić approached me.

“Hristo Spirović, my dear friend. My good friend. Thank you for helping us achieve peace. This winter our people will have heating. We will co-exist peacefully with our neighbours and there won't be any senseless killing. Peace is the only security for people. Thank you for helping us achieve it,” Chief Stanišić said.

We hugged. “Thank you, Jovica Stanišić, my dear friend. You were and still are, a champion of peace. Implement the peace agreement with the same dedication and determination with which you fought for peace. I will be nearby to help you if you need me,” I told the Chief of the Serbian and Yugoslav National Security Service.

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Milošević and Karadžić never had a relationship with each other. During twenty months of my engagement, I know for a fact that President Milošević never met with or talked to Karadžić directly. All contacts with Bosnian Serb leadership went through Jovica Stanišić, Chief of State Security, whose sole objective was to persuade Karadžić to support various peace proposals and liberate all U.N. peacekeepers that Karadžić was holding hostage.

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“Well, the meeting was at Villa Dobanovci. Everyone was present except General Mladić. Stanišić removed John Zametica, Karadžić's advisor, from the meeting before Milošević arrived. Karadžić arrived around noon. When Milošević entered the room, everyone froze. They all knew they had made huge mistakes at the expense of Serbian people.

Milošević was angry and determined. He immediately took Karadžić to a separate room. Just the two of them.

I was always Stanišić's contact person among the Bosnian Serb leaders. I simply did not have the power to influence things sufficiently.

While we were waiting for Milošević and Karadžić to come out, I asked Stanišić what was going to happen if Karadžić refused to sign the peace agreement.

“What did Stanišić tell you, Nikola?” I asked.

“Stanišić told me he would throw all of us in prison. That's what he told me,” Koljević answered.

“He is right, Nikola. I would say that Stanišić was quite generous with that answer. Most of you deserve life imprisonment, in solitary cells with no windows or doors,” I told Koljević.

“You're right, Chris. I submitted my resignation. We all did. What do you think? Should I resign?” Koljević asked me.

“No, Nikola. You have to stay, just like everyone else. You have to implement the provisions of the peace agreement. You people made a mess, as one says, you can't expect others to clean it up. Besides, you are the only voice of reason in that group. You have to stay. The agreement needs to be implemented in full,” I said.

“Milutinović and Stanišić said the same. We have to work on the full implementation of the agreement,” Nikola confirmed.

“Nikola, Stanišić told me that you did everything you could to assist with the previous peace proposals. He told me that you always supported a peaceful solution. You can't give up now when we've finally achieved it,” I told Koljević.

“Chris, this morning my wife told me that all of us from Bosnian Serb leadership should be ashamed of ourselves. You betrayed the Serbian people, she said. You should be ashamed. You have to resign. You messed up, she said. Now you have to go. You lost all credibility. That's what my wife told me early this morning,” Koljević added.

“I think your wife is speaking on behalf of a large majority of Serbian people, Nikola. You guys really messed up collectively,” I said.

“My mistakes were a failure to act, Chris. I thought I would be able to help us achieve peaceful co-existence by working on the inside. I presume I was wrong. And I feel ashamed. OK, Chris. I will stay. But you have to help us. We need your help in bringing investments back to Republika Srpska. You know people in the United States and in Greece. Will you help us?” Koljević asked me.

“Of course I will, Nikola. You have a lot of friends who will help if there is support for the peace agreement and if normal human behaviour returns to these parts of the world. Put down your weapons, Nikola. Tell Karadžić to implement the peace agreement and get out of the way, so that civilized human beings can lead Republika Srpska,” I told Koljević.

“Chris, Milošević came out of the private room with Karadžić and Karadžić immediately signed the peace agreement. Then the rest of them signed. I don't think Milošević gave Karadžić much room for manoeuvre. In fact, he gave him none. Karadžić also agreed to implement all provisions of the peace agreement fully,” Koljević added.

“Nikola, why didn't Ratko Mladić attend the meeting?” I asked.

“He is sick. He is sick, Chris. He's in the hospital, with an acute gall bladder attack, he has a gall stone,” Koljević answered.

“How will Mladić react to the Dayton peace agreement, Nikola?” I wondered.

“Mladić won't be a problem, Chris. You know, Mladić is essentially an honest man. He is a soldier, strong-willed, emotional. He has no ambition. Mladić could retire tomorrow in his city of birth and live far away from the public eye,” Koljević added.

“What about Krajišnik, Nikola? Is he going to be a problem?” I asked.

“Krajišnik is now a minority of one, Chris. The entire leadership of Republika Srpska was present yesterday, except Mladić. Krajišnik will in the end, I would say very soon, realise that the war is over. He will support the Dayton agreement, even against his will. He has no choice, just like Karadžić doesn't, or anyone else. Besides, Milošević and Stanišić won't tolerate anything anymore. They worked on achieving the peace agreement and lifting the sanctions, day and night, for years. Milutinović almost died from a heart attack while negotiating for peace, while Karadžić and Krajišnik played their fundamentalist war games. It's over now. Stanišić just told us, individually and collectively—your war games and your

obsession with killing people are finished. Peace has won, that's what Stanišić told us," Koljević said.

Curriculum Vitae Christos Chris Spirou

Born in Porti near Karditsa, Province of Thessaly, Greece, on 14 September 1942.
Emigrated to the United States of America in May 1956.

ELECTED AS:

Member, Manchester, New Hampshire, Council of Citizens of Model Towns, 1968–1970.
President, Union of Citizens of Model Northeastern Towns, 1968–1970.
Member, New Hampshire House of Representatives, 1970-1984.
Leader of the Democrats, New Hampshire House of Representatives, 1974–1984.
Member, City Council, Manchester, New Hampshire, 1971–1975.
Democratic nominee for governor, Federal State of New Hampshire, 1984.
Chair, New Hampshire, Democratic party, 1991–1994.
President, New Hampshire Presidential Electors for Bill Clinton, 1992.
President and CEO of the Hellenic American Union, Athens, Greece, 1994 until present.
President, International Congregation of Agia Sophia, 1995 until present.

APPOINTED AS:

Member, Executive Committee, White House, National Center for Voluntary Action,
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Member, Serbian/Yugoslav delegation at peace talks, Dayton, Ohio, USA, appointed by
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POLITICAL FUNCTIONS:

Member, New Hampshire Democratic State Committee, 1974 until present.
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President, New Hampshire, “Birch Bayh for President” Committee, 1976.
Delegate, Democratic National Convention, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 2000.
Chairman, Hillsborough County, New Hampshire, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1980.
Co-Chairman, State of New Hampshire, “Mondale for President” campaign, 1984.
Chairman, New Hampshire Democratic State Convention, 1986.
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Member, National Executive Committee, Greek Americans for Al Gore for President, 2000.
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